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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis examines the effects of management style on conflict between 
fisheries users, looking at Tanzania and South Africa as case studies. Research indicates 
that management programs that incorporate local communities while retaining a level of 
national support are more likely to be successful in enforcing rules and regulations, 
promoting sustainability, and reducing incidents of conflict between users. Nationally 
based programs that exclude local communities from management roles risk alienating 
local fisheries users and increasing violations and conflict. In a world of drastically 
expanding fisheries exploitation, management style will become increasingly important 
in ensuring that competition between users remains peaceful and fisheries resources are 
available for continued use. 
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 1 
I. THE ROLE OF MANAGEMENT IN MITIGATING CONFLICT 
RESULTING FROM FISHERIES DEPLETION 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the impact of fisheries management 
programs on conflict between fisheries users. It examines the role of fisheries degradation 
and how it may lead to conflict in Africa and whether a particular type of fishery 
management is more effective in preventing these conflicts. Rural, coastal communities in 
Africa share fisheries with an ever-increasing worldwide demand on this limited but critical 
resource. I am interested in exploring what security concerns may arise as a result of this 
dependence on over-stressed fisheries as the resource continues to diminish. Assuming that 
the type of management program employed in a given area can influence the level of 
conflict among fisheries users, I am interested in what implications this may have for 
fisheries management on a global scale and how this could potentially impact international 
security.  
A. SIGNIFICANCE  
The world’s human population continues to grow at an alarming rate. Currently at 
over 7 billion, the UN estimates that it will reach over 9 billion by 2050.1 As the population 
continues to grow, the need for food increases and so, too, do the demands placed on 
already strained ecosystems. In the more developed parts of the world, food is more readily 
available as a result of more advanced agricultural techniques and people are better able to 
compensate for nutritional shortages that may occur as a result of environmental decline. 
In less developed parts of the world, subsistence farming and natural resources still provide 
a significant portion of daily food sources. Many underdeveloped regions, including 
throughout southern Africa, rely heavily on fisheries as a primary source for protein and 
livelihood, and approximately 2.9 billion people worldwide rely on fish as a primary food 
source.2 However, developed nations demands on fisheries continue to grow and impact 
                                                 
1 “The World Population Prospects: 2015 Revision,” UN, July 29, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/
development/desa/publications/world-population-prospects-2015-revision.html. 
2 USAID, Fishing for Food Security: The Importance of Wild Fisheries for Food Security and 
Nutrition (Washington, DC: USAID, 2016), 9. 
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regions where fisheries provide critical sustenance and income. As these two worlds and 
their increasing demands clash over dwindling worldwide fish stocks, food and income 
shortages may drive desperate populations to the brink of their own survival mechanisms, 
potentially creating ever more security risks within fragile states.  
In Africa specifically, many coastal communities are particularly vulnerable as a 
result of their poor economic status and lack of alternative sources of income.3 The 
consequences of this clash in resource demands may range from famine to domestic 
insecurity as starving and unemployed populations seek alternative means of survival. 
Fragile states, lacking financial, political, and security resources face increased domestic 
strain from displaced and starving populations unless effective management techniques can 
be implemented in the near future. Understanding the root causes of conflict, such as 
degradation of a key natural resource, will enable local governments and the international 
community to identify at risk regions and sources of conflict and to implement effective 
policy responses. 
The nature of commercial fishing and global trade makes regional fisheries 
degradation a potential source of international conflict, as well. The worldwide impacts of 
resource constraints have already been seen in the piracy epidemic that started in Somalia 
and impacted global trade. Numerous scholars have observed that Somali pirates were 
originally fishermen trying to defend their livelihoods and primary food source against 
illegal commercial fishers who were taking advantage of uncontrolled waters and marine 
stocks after the fall of the Somali government.4 While this conflict started as a resource 
and livelihood competition between artisanal fishers and large, foreign commercial entities, 
it ballooned into a security crisis on a global scale. This case provides an illustration of 
resource constraints leading to security crises on an international scale.   
                                                 
3 Vicky W.Y. Lam, William W.L. Cheung, W Swartz, and UR Sumaila, “Climate Change Impacts on 
Fisheries in West Africa: Implications for Economic, Food and Nutritional Security,” African Journal of 
Marine Science 34, no. 1 (2012): 104. 
4 U. Rashid Sumaila, and Mahamudu Bawumia, “Fisheries, Ecosystem Justice, and Piracy: A Case 
Study of Somalia,” Fisheries Research 157 (2014): 154. 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is very little literature looking at the link between national security and 
fisheries degradation. Most research focuses on topics around the periphery of this issue, 
looking at the changing definition of security itself, links between other types of 
environmental degradation and insecurity, how climate change is affecting fisheries and 
livelihoods in Africa and across the globe, and fisheries management techniques as 
implemented by various countries across the continent. Some literature does look at the 
link between food security and human security, occasionally mentioning fisheries as a key 
food source, but even this falls short of taking the next step in tying this to national security, 
let alone security on a global scale. The one exception I have found to this dearth of 
information is a collection of articles that look at Somali piracy arising from local 
fishermen attempting to thwart illegal commercial fishermen taking advantage of 
uncontrolled waters.5 As such, any research into this topic will have to use what literature 
exists and examine whether there is a connection between the various peripheral topics that 
have been studied. It is worth noting that all of the above factors are highly relevant to 
African studies and literature about the challenges that Africa faces as a result of food 
shortages, climate change, and the abundant variety of security problems that the region 
faces. Rather than a shortage of information, it is the specific connection between them and 
the resulting link to national and international security that is missing.  
1. Environmental Degradation as a Security Issue 
One key issue surrounding this question is the classification of environmental 
security itself. The notion of what constitutes a security threat has grown and evolved as 
technology and warfare have expanded, becoming more nuanced. From computer hackers 
to nuclear weapons, the world of security is more complicated now than at any time in the 
past, but one perspective holds that security is still generally accepted to be “concerned 
only with military threats or those related to an ‘enemy.’”6 From this viewpoint, 
                                                 
5 Ghassan Schbley and William Rosenau, “Piracy, Illegal Fishing, and Maritime Insecurity in Somalia, 
Kenya, and Tanzania” CNA Analysis & Solutions paper, Sept 2013. 
6 Gareth Porter, “Environmental Security as a National Security Issue,” Current History (1995): 218. 
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environmental concerns constitute neither a direct military threat nor deal with any specific 
enemy. On the other side of the argument, however, Mathews maintains that environmental 
issues are a global threat to all mankind.7 From her perspective, security need not utilize 
military might in order to pose an existential threat. Arguments in favor of both sides of 
the debate exist, but the question of how to qualify environmental security remains 
undecided.8  
The classification of environmental security sparked another debate as to whether 
environmental degradation could pose a specific national security threat. This debate takes 
a similar form to the larger classification of environmental security as a security issue and 
is one that spans back several decades. Numerous academics delve in depth into human 
security, food security, environmental stability, and climate change vulnerability 
individually. However, research on the relationship between national security and the 
specific environmental security issue of fisheries, is limited. Porter does contemplate how 
and why environmental security issues could become national security threats, but his 
article is a much broader piece that does not look into specifics or outline in detail the 
impacts or implications of failing to consider environmental degradation. Levy maintains 
that further research into the causes of regional conflict is needed in order to fully 
understand environment-national security connections.9 He further questions whether 
environmental degradations could pose any true threat to the U.S. However, this may not 
be the case with less developed countries whose populations depend more closely on 
limited environmental resources.  
Several articles pointing to potential mass migrations as people relocate in search 
of alternative food sources, thus putting pressure on other fragile systems, offer another 
                                                 
7 Jessica Mathews, “Redefining Security,” Foreign Affairs 68 (1989): 162. 
8 Daniel Deudney, “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” 
Journal of International Studies (1990): 461. Terry Terriff, “The ‘Earth Summit’: Are There Any Security 
Implications?” Arms Control 13 (1992): 163.  
9 Marc A. Levy, “Is the Environment a National Security Issue?” International Security 20 (1995): 36. 
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perspective on how environmental degradation could lead to internal conflict.10 As 
populations and environmental changes lead to environmental degradation and resource 
depletion in one region, the only recourse for survival becomes relocating in an attempt to 
seek out new resources.11 As Lam et al. observe, depleted maritime fisheries, which 
account for a significant portion of dietary protein, could force coastal populations inland 
to seek new means of survival. However, inland populations whose agricultural subsistence 
has been depleted as a result of topsoil erosion or changes in weather patterns may also 
attempt to relocate in order to seek out alternatives for themselves.12 These newly uprooted 
populations become internally displaced, creating domestic social unrest as migrant 
populations clash over limited space and resources. To some extent, this has already been 
seen in areas of drought and famine, where environmental migrants are unwelcome in 
regions already struggling to support local populations. Some argue that this pattern was 
visible in the Syrian refugee crisis that swept across Europe as a result of severe water 
shortages that contributed to the still on-going war.  
Migration is only one of several factors that could lead to conflict. Several articles 
point to economic pressures resulting from environmental degradation as a potential cause 
of conflict. Myers describes the path to regional conflict as a result of environmental 
degradation leading to economic decline and destabilization.13 As environmental scarcity 
becomes increasingly problematic, countries whose economies rely on natural resources 
face a more strained economic outlook and potential economic instability.14 Throughout 
Africa, fisheries serve as a critical food source for artisanal fishers, but they are also a 
                                                 
10 Vicky W.Y. Lam, William W.L. Cheung, W Swartz, and UR Sumaila, “Climate Change Impacts on 
Fisheries in West Afica: Implications for Economic, Food and Nutritional Security,” African Journal of 
Marine Science 34(1) 2012: 104. 
11 Thomas Homer Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases” 
International Security, 19(1): 20.  
12 Vicky W.Y. Lam, William W.L. Cheung, W Swartz, and UR Sumaila, “Climate Change Impacts on 
Fisheries in West Afica: Implications for Economic, Food and Nutritional Security,” African Journal of 
Marine Science 34(1) 2012: 104. 
13 Norman Myers, “The Environmental Dimension to Security Issues,” The Environmentalist, Vol 6., 
Number 4 (1986): 251. 
14 Gareth Porter, “Environmental Security as a National Security Issue,” Current History (1995): 220. 
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source of income for commercial fishers. This dual use of a diminishing resource creates a 
conflict of interests. 
The violence seen in Senegal between commercial and artisanal fishers fits that 
described by Homer-Dixon in his 1994 article examining the connection between 
environmental scarcity and conflict.15 He argues that scarcity will lead to an increase in 
violence, but that it “will usually be sub-national,” like that seen in Senegal.16 However, 
while he does specify that this conflict will be limited in scope, he also theorizes that 
conflict may rise to the level that it will affect state institutions and that the state will be 
unable to effectively respond. This article introduces the possibility of environmental 
degradation posing a direct threat to national security.  
2. African Fisheries 
Articles about the current state of African fisheries point to both human stress and 
climate change as primary factors in fisheries degradation and that measures to mitigate 
both factors are critical to the survival of fisheries as a resource.17 However, most articles 
about the effects of climate change on African fisheries stress the detrimental lack of 
information and climate modeling for the continent as a whole. What data is available has 
been largely derived from research programs in South Africa or is based off of satellite 
observations.18 Available articles discuss the specific effects of climate change on various 
fish species and types of fisheries: e.g., migratory and resident fish species. Works also 
examine the effects on fisheries conditions: namely food sources and habitat for native 
fishes as a result of warming temperatures. Several articles detail how certain species will 
                                                 
15 Thomas Homer Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases” 
International Security, 19 (1994): 5–40.  
16 Ibid., 6. 
17 Allison, Edward H., Allison L. Perry, Marie-Caroline Badjeck, W. Neil Adger, Katrina Brown, 
Declan Conway, Ashley S. Halls, et al, “Vulnerability of National Economies to the Impacts of Climate 
Change on Fisheries,” Fish and Fisheries10, no. 2 (06, 2009): 187. Dyhia Belhabib, Vicky W.Y. Lam, 
William W.L. Cheung, “Overview of West African Fisheries Under Climate Change: Impacts, 
Vulnerabilities and Adaptive Responses of the Artisanal and Industrial Sectors,” Marine Policy 71 (2016): 
15. 
18 W. M. Potts, A. Gotz, N. James, “Review of the Projected Impacts of Climate Change on Coastal 
Fishes in Southern Africa,”  Rev Fish Biol Fisheries 25 (2015): 609. 
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migrate further south, to more temperate climates, as tropical waters warm.19 This shift 
south could leave tropical fishers, such as those in Tanzania and Mozambique, devoid of 
once plentiful fish stocks, directly impacting the over 200,000 individuals in Tanzania who 
rely on fisheries for either food or income.20 However, the effects on fisheries are not 
identical on each side of the continent, as climate driven changes are predicted to vary 
based on location.21  
Several articles focus on more specific regions, such as South Africa or specific 
fishing villages in Tanzania, but still have bearing on a larger region. One such article 
discusses the same species shifts toward cooler waters and the resulting population 
depletion in tropical zones. This study also mentions the potential for otherwise unrelated 
species coming into contact, thereby altering the food chain and introducing new predators 
into areas where species are already stressed.22 Similar to other literature, the importance 
of fisheries to African communities is emphasized, as is the fact that climate driven changes 
will affect every population dependent on these fisheries, from artisanal fishers to large, 
commercial companies.23 One article examines the economic and socioeconomic 
consequences of fisheries depletion as a result of climate change, noting that West African 
fisheries in particular are incapable of ensuring future food security or ecological 
sustainability.24 The consequences of such changes impact both food security and national 
level economics.  
While literature discussing the effects of climate change on Africa is abundant, it 
largely focuses on the factors that make the continent as a whole more vulnerable than 
                                                 
19 Dyhia Belhabib, Vicky W.Y. Lam, and William W.L. Cheung, “Overview of West African 
Fisheries Under Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptive Responses of the Artisanal and 
Industrial Sectors,” Marine Policy 71 (2016): 15. 
20 Ibid., 604. 
21 Barry M. Clark, “Climate change: A looming challenge for fisheries management in southern 
Africa,” Marine Policy 30 (2006): 87. 
22 Ibid., 86. 
23 Ibid., 90. 
24 Vicky W.Y. Lam, William W.L. Cheung, W Swartz, and UR Sumaila, “Climate Change Impacts on 
Fisheries in West Afica: Implications for Economic, Food and Nutritional Security,” African Journal of 
Marine Science 34(1) (2012): 104. 
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other parts of the world. As the majority of the population in Africa live well below the 
poverty line and exist off of subsistence farming and artisanal fishing, they stand to suffer 
far more from the effects of fisheries depletion or changes in soil and rainfall patterns that 
could degrade their crops. Subsistence farmers and fishers lack the capacity to compensate 
for these changes in their primary source of food.25 Some studies do delve into the impact 
that degraded fisheries have on vulnerable populations and look as how this vulnerability 
can be measured, as well as what strategies may be adopted to mitigate vulnerability.26  
Fisheries have already begun to feel the effects of climate change and what little 
data exists on the current state of African fisheries indicates that shortages are already 
posing problems. Local artisanal fishermen already report smaller fish catches, the need to 
pursue juveniles in the absence of fully grown fish, and changes in species distribution.27 
This strain has become visible in the span of a single lifetime, with older fishermen 
reporting significant decreases in overall quantity and size of catch from the time they 
began fishing decades earlier. 
DuBois and Zografos identify cases of violence between artisanal and commercial 
fishers in Senegal.28 This article connects observed violence with the depletion of fish 
stocks, noting that violent encounters are taking place with increasing frequency and are 
widespread across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. While this piece does state that various 
options exist to resolve the conflicts, it also explains that few of these options have been 
successful and that conflict is taking place with increasing frequency. Limitations of this 
article are that it looks specifically at interactions at sea and only those between commercial 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 103. 
26 Sara Huges, Annie Yai, Lisa Max, Nada Petrovic, Frank Davenport, Michael Marshall, Timothy R. 
McClanahan, Edward H. Allison, Joshua E. Cinner, “A Framework to Assess National Level Vulnerability 
from the Perspective of Food Security: The Case of Coral Reef Fisheries,” Environmental Science & Policy 
23 (2012): 95–108  
27 Dyhia Belhabib, Vicky W.Y. Lam, William W.L. Cheung, “Overview of West African fisheries 
Under Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptive Responses of the Artisanal and Industrial 
Sectors,” Marine Policy 71 (2016): 15. 
28 Caroly DuBois, and Christos Zografos, “Conflicts at Sea Between Artisanal and Industrial Fishers: 
Inter-sectoral Interactions and Dispute Resolution in Senegal,” Marine Policy 36 (2012): 1211. 
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and artisanal fishers. The article does not look at conflict among artisanal fishers or at the 
effects that these disputes may have on national security.  
3. African Fisheries Management 
Effective management of African fisheries may offer a means to mitigate the 
potential security threats posed by degradation. Local and national level management may 
reduce some threats to fisheries, such as illegal fishing, inappropriate fishing gear, and 
overfishing.29 Across Africa, illegal fishing accounts for a difference of approximately 40 
percent more catch than is reported, making accurate evaluation of fisheries health 
significantly more difficult.30 Some countries already employ management programs. As 
with other areas of interest, information on fisheries management throughout Africa is 
limited but information on some countries is more readily available than others. For 
example, South African fisheries are relatively widely discussed and a larger collection of 
information is more readily available on management programs and research. Similarly, 
several articles and reports are available on management programs for Tanzanian fisheries. 
Findings suggest that tying specific management programs to the individual needs of the 
community, the development level of the country and the vulnerability to fisheries 
depletion, are critical to establishing effective management and mitigating the risk of food 
insecurity.31 Programs must take into consideration both artisanal fishing and factors at the 
national level that local fishers cannot influence.32 
Many of the articles on this topic stress the importance of fisheries to the 
populations and economies across Africa. Even articles that focus on much smaller regions, 
                                                 
29 USAID, The Importance of Wild Fisheries For Local Food Security: Tanzania, Washington, DC.: 2. 
30 David J. Agnew, John Pearce, Ganapathiraju Pramo, Tom Peatman, Reg Watson, John R. 
Beddington, Tony J. Pitcher, “Estimating the Worldwide Extent of Illegal Fishing,” PloS ONE 4(2) (2009): 
1. 
31 Sara Hughes, Annie Yau, Lisa Max, Nada Petrovic, Frank Davenport, Michael Marshall, Timothy 
R. McClanahan, Edward H. Allison, Joshua E. Cinner, “A Framework to Assess National Level 
Vulnerability from the Perspective of Food Security: The Case of Coral Reef Fisheries,” Environmental 
Science & Policy 23 (2012): 95. 
32 Catherine M. Marquette Kwame A. Koranteng, Ragnhil Overa, Ellen Bortei-Doku Aryeetey, 
“Small scale fisheries, population dynamics, and resource use in Africa: The Case of Moree, Ghana,” 
Ambio 31(4) Jun, 2002: 324. 
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such as individual towns or fishing communities, identify the already visibly reduced fish 
stocks as having an effect on local incomes and food supply.33 In these localities, issues 
with management include lack of regulations knowledge and enforcement.34 Various 
management strategies are also discussed, as are options for how to cope with present and 
anticipated fisheries depletion.35 Another common thread through the literature is the lack 
of research and data that exists in the region. The overall theme appears to be that further 
information is needed in order to develop effective management strategies, which could be 
critical in mitigating fisheries depletion. If effective management strategies can be 
identified and employed, this could preserve fish as a food and economic resources, 
reducing the potential for regional conflict. 
C. CONFLICT MECHANISMS AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES  
Due to the limited information on the proposed topic, any connection between 
fisheries degradation and security is currently highly speculative. In order to understand 
how security may be influenced by fisheries depletion, any link will have to be built off 
the limited available research and literature. Based on existing literature, it is clear that 
fisheries are key to food and economic security in coastal communities throughout Africa. 
The literature also suggests that threats to local security resulting from fisheries depletion 
may provide a link to the larger umbrella of national security as local communities vie for 
limited resources. The case of Somalia’s pirates is often cited as the worst case scenario 
for competition over food resources escalating to a national and international security 
crisis. Another potential catalyst, observable in the literature, is the dramatic increase in 
local and global demand, driving resource depletion, which pushes resource users beyond 
legal and traditional territories and into neighboring states. From there, a connection may 
be found to security on both a domestic and an international scale through increasingly 
hostile user interactions, illegal fishing, and forced migrations. However, the insecurities 
                                                 
33 Nathaniel Colbert-Sangree, Jordan F. Suter, “Community Based Fishery Management within Menai 
Bay Conservation Area: A Survey of the Resource User,” Marine Policy 60 (2015): 174. 
34 Ibid., 175. 
35 USAID, Fishing for Food Security: The Importance of Wild Fisheries for Food Security and 
Nutrition (Washington, DC, April 2016), 20. 
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that currently appear in the literature are not exhaustive. To be more inclusive, this thesis 
identifies additional factors, including poor management strategies, which lead from 
fishery degradation to conflict in Africa.  
Currently, there are two primary management styles employed in Africa: national 
and co-management. National management approaches are less likely to be effective due 
to the lack of local buy-in and unwillingness of affected communities to participate in 
measures that they feel are exclusive and impinge on their livelihoods. Between the two 
management programs, co-management is most likely to be effective because it considers 
local input in both the development of the management strategy and implementation of 
regulations. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Researching the question of how management styles affect conflict among fisheries 
users necessitates looking at a broad spectrum of literature covering related topics and 
attempting to identify connections and themes that may exist. Given the common trend that 
research and data on the topic and in the region are extremely limited, this thesis draws on 
a wide variety of subjects over a number of years to gather sufficient information. I use this 
existing literature to identify causal factors that lead from from fisheries depletion to 
conflict and insecurity. By identifying these factors, I demonstrate how this issue plays out 
in Africa and on a larger international stage. Because information on South Africa and 
Tanzania is more prevalent than other parts of southern Africa, I focus on these two 
countries in order to identify sufficient information from which to draw conclusions. 
Information about both Tanzania and South Africa is derived from academic articles and 
from studies conducted by several non-governmental organizations. In the case of 
Tanzania, some state-funded data has helped provide further insight into the current status 
of fisheries and the fishing sector. Information about South Africa is primarily derived from 
academic articles and some investigative reports. 
Fisheries in both Tanzania and South Africa are already showing signs of 
degradation that are visible to local populations, but conflict among these communities 
manifest differently. Especially in the case of South Africa, management strategies have 
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been put into place to mitigate these changes, and the effects of these programs on fisheries 
dependent peoples have been examined.36 Limiting access to fisheries for artisanal and 
traditional fishers in favor of commercial fishers has caused significant internal security 
challenges in South Africa that have had dramatic effects on fisheries resources.37 This 
dynamic demonstrates conflicting interests between dependent populations and national 
economic motivations. 
In Tanzania, mitigating fisheries degradation has taken the form of designated 
maritime protected areas (MPAs). Some authors have examined the effects of these areas 
on dependent, local populations, finding that management programs often conflict with 
traditional fisheries use.38 Fisheries degradation in coastal Tanzania has been found to have 
negative effects on social structure and interactions, resulting in low-level social discord 
that falls below the level of conflict and remains at the local level.39 These two cases 
provide sufficient evidence of fisheries dependence and degradation. Both countries also 
face pressures at regional and national levels as a result of fisheries degradation. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The first chapter within this thesis introduces the topic at hand. This chapter fleshes 
out the thesis question and the significance of the issue. Accordingly, it discusses why this 
topic was chosen, and introduces the related case studies. The literature review examines 
existing primary and secondary sources surrounding the topic. This chapter provides 
insight into what has already been studied specifically in regards to fisheries and security, 
but also to issues related to the various mechanisms already discussed. 
                                                 
36 George M. Branch and Barry M. Clark, “Fish Stocks and Their Management: The Changing Face 
of Fisheries in South Africa,” Marine Policy 30 (2006): 3. 
37 L. van Sittert, G. Branch, M. Hauck, M. Sowman, “Benchmarking the First Decade of Post-
Apartheid Fisheries Reform in South Africa,” Marine Policy 30 (2006): 96. 
38 James Tobey, and Elin Torell, “Coastal Poverty and MPA Management in Mainland Tanzania and 
Zanzibar,” Ocean & Coastal Management 49, no. 11 (0, 2006): 834. 
39 Robert Katikiro, Ashoka Deepananda, and Edison Macusi, “Interplay Between Perceived Changes 
in Fishery and Social Structures in Tanzanian Coastal Fishing Communities,” Fisheries Research 164 
(2015): 249. 
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Chapter two outlines the past and current status of African fisheries and resource 
use. This chapter looks at the issues that African fisheries are facing, including problems 
with overfishing, pollution, and climate change.  
The third chapter is broken into two sections. The first section explores existing 
cases of conflict within fisheries sectors throughout Africa. The second section of this 
chapter looks at current strategies for managing fisheries and the effects that they have on 
fisheries users. The management strategies identified are the most prevalent in countries 
throughout African and consist of national management and co-management. 
Finally, the case studies in chapters four and five evaluate the application of 
different management styles in both Tanzania and South Africa. These chapters 
demonstrate the effects that each management style has on the local community and their 
interactions with other resource users. Both case studies look in depth at how management 
style affects security and the communities that are directly involved in the struggle to 
sustain viable resources. Tanzania and South Africa have adopted different strategies for 
coping with fisheries depletion and each of their styles illustrates the importance of 
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II. TRADITIONAL STATUS OF AFRICAN FISHERIES
African fisheries face a unique set of challenges resulting from a combination of 
overuse and changing climate that threatens their ability to continue to sustain the 
communities that subsist off of them. Traditional fishing communities have long relied on 
near-shore fish stocks for economic and food security, which have thus far effectively 
provided for local populations. The combination of underdeveloped African states and 
widely dispersed communities has allowed highly productive off-shore fisheries to remain 
largely under-exploited until recent years, as the situation changes in the face of rapid 
population growth and increased global demand for seafood. No longer under-utilized, 
Africa’s fisheries are straining to feed higher demand and communities that historically 
had little to no contact are now in competition for limited resources. Increased demand has 
brought with it habitat destruction, human and fish migration, and fisheries depletion, 
creating new challenges for the entire fishing sector as well as the fisheries themselves. As 
a critical source of animal protein and employment across the continent, the health of 
Africa’s fisheries sector is vital to security and prosperity.40  
This chapter sets up the thesis’ analysis of fishery insecurities, conflict and 
management by describing the various actors who rely on Africa’s fisheries. It explains 
their roles and interactions with the fisheries and discusses how they interact with one 
another. Finally, this chapter delves into some of the current challenges facing Africa’s 
fisheries and how they affect the individual actors. 
A. MAIN ACTORS 
1. Artisanal Fishers
1.1. Activities: Artisanal fishers rely on fishing as a source of both food and income. 
They are typically individual men who fish to provide food for themselves and their 
families, selling some portion of their catch locally. Artisanal fishers often employ 
40 Vicky W.Y. Lam, William W.L. Cheung, W. Swartz, and U. R. Sumaila. “Climate Change Impacts 
on Fisheries in West Africa: Implications for Economic, Food and Nutritional Security,” African Journal of 
Marine Science 34, no. 1 (Mar 01, 2012): 103. 
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traditional fishing methods and gear, such as canoes, fishing nets, and lines distinguishing 
them from the more technologically advanced commercial sector.41 Traditional artisanal 
fishing vessels hold only a few people and most fishers take to the water individually or in 
small groups.42 Many artisanal fishers live in small, rural communities, where fishing is a 
primary occupation, which the community as a whole relies on for both work and food. 
Gear and equipment limitations mean that artisanal fishers generally operate in shallower 
waters, relying on habitats such as coral reefs and mangrove forests in near-shore, local 
waters.43 The smaller and less advanced technology employed by artisanal fishers means 
that they catch far less than commercial vessels and are more limited in their range.44 Some 
subsistence fishers have adopted more modern gear and technology that enables them to 
participate in migratory fishing, following fish migrations or traveling away from their 
community to fish in more distant waters, but the majority remain local to their 
communities, plying traditional fishing grounds.45 Few artisanal fishers have the financial 
resources to acquire larger vessels or the means to find alternative employment, which is 
seldom available in their rural communities and in Africa’s poor economic conditions. 
Despite the increasing numbers of larger commercial vessels, artisanal fishers still make 
up the majority of fisheries users. 
1.2. Economic Contributions: Inadequate local infrastructure prevents artisanal 
fishers from transporting fish beyond their community, preventing fishers from selling their 
catch outside local markets.46 Lack of viable infrastructure and limited market 
41 Carolyn DuBois, and Christos Zografos, “Conflicts at Sea between Artisanal and Industrial Fishers: 
Inter-Sectoral Interactions and Dispute Resolution in Senegal,” Marine Policy 36, no. 6 (11, 2012): 1211. 
42 Ibid., 1213. 
43 Desiderius C. P. Masalu, “Coastal and Marine Resource use Conflicts and Sustainable Development 
in Tanzania,” Ocean and Coastal Management 43, no. 6 (0, 2000). 489. 
44 C. M. Marquette, K. A. Koranteng, R. Overaa, and E. B. Aryeetey, “Small-Scale Fisheries, 
Population Dynamics, and Resource use in Africa: The Case of Moree, Ghana,” Ambio 31, no. 4 (06, 2002): 
324. 
45 Innocent Ngao Wanyonyi, Andrew Wamukota, Simeon Mesaki, Almeida Tomas Guissamulo, and 
Jacob Ochiewo. “Artisanal Fisher Migration Patterns in Coastal East Africa,” Ocean & Coastal 
Management 119, (01, 2016): 94. 
46 James Tobey, and Elin Torell. “Coastal Poverty and MPA Management in Mainland Tanzania and 
Zanzibar,” Ocean & Coastal Management 49, no. 11 (0, 2006): 845. 
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opportunities present challenges in transporting commercially caught fish to rural regions, 
making local communities reliant on artisanal fishers for their supply of seafood.  This 
dynamic limits artisanal fishers from contributing directly to the national economy while 
simultaneously making them critical to local economies and local food security. Although 
unable to compete directly on the national level, artisanal fishers’ contributions to their 
local economies have a significant impact on the overall national economy, largely through 
employment.47 Artisanal and small-scale fishing provides income and employment for 
more than just fishers themselves, accounting for over 180,000 jobs in Tanzania alone 
when fisheries related work such as fish mongers are taken into consideration.48 Small-
scale fishing provides the majority of fisheries jobs in Africa and is also attributed with 
making up the majority of fish caught.49  
1.3. Limitations: The limited range of artisanal fishers historically translates into 
more heavily exploited near-shore than deep-water fisheries.50 The small vessels employed 
by artisanal fishers are less adapted for deep water fishing and are better equipped for 
catching smaller, shallow water fish than larger commercial species, such as tuna, found 
further out in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and pursued by many commercial 
vessels.51 Historically, fishing in near-shore and coastal areas, such as coral reefs, have 
been sufficient to meet the majority of artisanal fishers’ needs, leaving the more distant 
off-shore and deep water fisheries for growing commercial fleets.52 The result of this 
pattern of exploitation is that Africa’s offshore resources historically remained largely 
under-utilized 
47 W. M. Potts, A. Gotz, and N. James. “Review of the Projected Impacts of Climate Change on Coastal 
Fishes in Southern Africa,” Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries 25, no. 4 (12, 2015): 604. 
48 Ibid., 604. 
49 C. M. Marquette, K. A. Koranteng, R. Overaa, and E. B. Aryeetey. “Small-Scale Fisheries, 
Population Dynamics, and Resource use in Africa: The Case of Moree, Ghana,” Ambio 31, no. 4 (06, 2002): 
324. 
50 S. Diop and P. A. Scheren. “Sustainable Oceans and Coasts: Lessons Learnt from Eastern and 
Western Africa,” Estuarine, Coastal and Shelf Science 183, (Dec 20, 2016): 331. 
51 A. I. Payne. “The Exploitation of African Fisheries,” Oikos 27, no. 3 (0, 1976): 362. 
52 Ibid., 362. 
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2. Commercial Fishers
2.1. Activities: Africa’s commercial fishing industry has grown rapidly in recent 
years and now includes both domestic commercial fleets and increasing numbers of 
international vessels. The commercial industry employs more modern technology than 
traditional, artisanal fishers, including larger vessels capable of deeper water fishing, 
modern gear, such as longlines and purse seine nets, radars, larger hold capacity, and the 
ability to refrigerate catch for transport to distant markets. Africa’s growing commercial 
industry targets commercially viable fish stocks, such as tuna, abalone, lobster, and 
swordfish, most of which are destined for international markets. The export market in some 
countries is a significant part of the economy, accounting for up to 10% of Tanzania’s total 
national economy between 2009 and 2013.53  
Commercial fishing off of Africa’s coasts has grown quickly, facilitated by the 
rapid increase in international fishing vessels obtaining licenses to fish in African waters 
as their own domestic stocks are depleted. Along with the expanding fishing fleets, the 
ashore fishing industry has also grown, to include fish processing facilities, all of which 
fall under the commercial fishing sector. The financial reach of the commercial fishing 
sector has made it an increasingly important industry for African economies.  
2.2.1. Domestic Commercial Fishers: Fishing activities across all sectors 
throughout Africa are expanding, despite numerous early challenges with establishing 
deep-water, commercial fleets.54 In many countries across the continent, high costs 
associated with creating and operating deep water fishing fleets, combined with poor 
economies, impeded the growth of a domestic commercial industry. Purchasing vessels 
and acquiring training for professional crews only accounts for a portion of the high costs 
associated with establishing a deep-water fleet. Land based infrastructure is an essential 
aspect to commercial fishing and states must invest heavily in costly infrastructure to 
53 Yohana L. Budeba, The Tanzanian Fisheries Sector: Challenges and Opportunities, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, September 2016. 20. 
54 A. I. Payne, “The Exploitation of African Fisheries,” Oikos 27, no. 3 (0, 1976): 356. 
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ensure a successful commercial sector.55 Despite the slow start, the commercial sector is 
increasing and multiple states now boast their own domestic, commercial fishing fleets that 
serve both international and domestic markets. Commercial fleets pursue deep-water fish, 
such as tuna and billfish, but also ply near-shore waters for commercially viable shallow 
waters stocks, such as lobster and abalone.56 Domestic commercial fleets are still small 
enough and lacking in supporting land-based infrastructure that they are not thoroughly 
exploiting offshore fisheries, despite widespread interest in expanding existing fleets.57  
2.2.2. International Commercial Fishers: Africa’s growing commercial industry 
is augmented by a growing number of international fishing vessels seeking to supplement 
their own diminishing domestic fisheries. In an effort to capitalize on their fisheries and in 
response to growing international demand, African states have begun authorizing 
increasing numbers of international commercial fishing vessels within their EEZs by 
selling fishing licenses to foreign fishers. International fleets are a growing presence in 
many African states’ EEZs, bringing in licensing fees to the host nation and boosting 
Africa’s economy, but are not as profitable for individual countries as a larger domestic 
commercial fleet could be. Most foreign commercial vessels remain offshore and target 
large fish, such as tuna, for export overseas.58 Driven by diminished domestic fisheries, 
most international fishers receive significant subsidies from their home state to compensate 
fishing companies for the high costs of operating distant waters fleets.59 Most international 
vessels hail from Asia or Europe, the same importer of the majority of Africa’s 
internationally sold fish products. Both of these regions also suffer extensive domestic 
fisheries degradation. In Asia, disputes over maritime resources are ongoing involving 
55 Ibid., 363. 
56 André Standing, “Criminality in Africa’s Fishing Industry: A Threat to Human Security,” Africa 
Security Briefs no. 33 (06, 2017): 3. 
57 Yohana L. Budeba, The Tanzanian Fisheries Sector: Challenges and Opportunities, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, September 2016: 4. 
58 S. Diop, and P. A. Scheren, “Sustainable Oceans and Coasts: Lessons Learnt from Eastern and 
Western Africa,” Estuarine, Coastal and Shelf Science 183, (Dec 20, 2016): 331. 
59 André Standing, “Criminality in Africa’s Fishing Industry: A Threat to Human Security,” Africa 
Security Briefs no. 33 (06, 2017): 3. 
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multiple countries. Africa’s international licensing and relatively plentiful waters offer 
alternatives for many countries seeking new fishing grounds.  
2.2.3. Tourism: Tourism is a relatively new addition to the fisheries sector. 
Increasingly, tourists visit Africa’s coasts, bringing much needed revenue and expanding 
the economic significance of the still small sector. This industry incorporates a variety of 
interests, ranging from recreational fishing and snorkeling, to consuming freshly caught 
seafood and sport fishing. Hotels seek out pristine beaches and coral reefs for guests to 
enjoy, while fishing expedition companies offer fishing boats and guides. Annual revenues 
from the tourist industry have nearly doubled within the span of a decade, growing from 
$824 million in 2005 to $1.4 billion in 2013.60 The continued growth of the tourist industry 
has earned the attention of national governments around the continent, and has become a 
top employer in Tanzania.61 Although a relatively new player in the fisheries sector, 
tourism is growing in importance and plays an increasingly prominent role. National 
governments, eager to encourage further growth, cater to its interests and formulate new 
laws and regulations that benefit the industry.  
B. CURRENT CHALLENGES 
In line with global trends, Africa’s fisheries are becoming increasingly crowded as 
numbers of fisheries users grow. Growing populations, migration, and increased domestic 
and international demand for seafood place tremendous pressure on limited resources. 
Increasing demand, decreasing demand and low state capacity are some of the problems 
that Africa’s fisheries currently face. 
1. Increased Demand
1.1. Increased Local Artisanal Use: Widespread population growth has 
significantly increased coastal and deep-water fisheries exploitation across the continent. 
Not only has a larger global population created higher worldwide demand for commercial 
60 World Bank, “Tanzania Economic Update: The Elephant in the Room. Unlocking the Potential of 
the Tourism Industry for Tanzanians,” (6 January 2015): 21. http://www.worldbank.org/tanzania/
economicupdate. 
61 Ibid., V. 
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fish, but Africa’s rapidly expanding population has created similarly rapid growth in the 
number of artisanal fishers relying on their local fish stocks. Demanding more and more 
resources to feed growing families, today’s artisanal fishers are not only more numerous; 
they require more fish than their predecessors.62 Improved healthcare has led to lower 
infant mortality rates producing larger families than in the past. The result of this 
population growth is that more fishers are now relying on the same resource and demanding 
more from it. Local fishermen already see the effects in their daily catches. Older fishermen 
report both smaller total catches and that fish caught are physically smaller.63 Increased 
demand on fisheries prevents existing fish from reaching physical maturity, resulting in 
physically smaller fish and less capacity for fisheries to recover.  
1.2. Increased In-migration: Population growth in fishing communities is also the 
result of increased migration to coastal areas. Unable to sustain themselves and their 
families, residents from inland communities contending with unemployment, drought, poor 
land conditions, or food insecurity have sought out alternative livelihoods in coastal 
communities.64 While such migration is not a recent phenomenon, the increasing numbers 
of migrants adds further stress to already overpopulated fishing grounds by taking up 
fishing themselves or by increasing the number of individuals relying on fish as a critical 
food source. Existing climate models indicate that environmental stresses on existing 
agricultural land will continue to increase, even as the population continues to grow. The 
combination of increased population and reduced farming capacity will force more 
migrants to the coast, placing even more pressure on over-extended fisheries.65 Coastal 
migration compounds the already expanding local fishing population to create increasingly 
62 Dyhia Belhabib, Vicky W. Y. Lam, and William W. L. Cheung, “Overview of West African Fisheries 
Under Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptive Responses of the Artisanal and Industrial 
Sectors,” Marine Policy 71, (09, 2016): 20. 
63 Allison, Edward H., Allison L. Perry, Marie-Caroline Badjeck, W. Neil Adger, Katrina Brown, 
Declan Conway, Ashley S. Halls, et al, “Vulnerability of National Economies to the Impacts of Climate 
Change on Fisheries,” Fish and Fisheries10, no. 2 (06, 2009): 187 
64 Vicky W.Y. Lam, William W.L. Cheung, W. Swartz, and U. R. Sumaila, “Climate Change Impacts 
on Fisheries in West Africa: Implications for Economic, Food and Nutritional Security,” African Journal of 
Marine Science 34, no. 1 (Mar 01, 2012): 104. 
65 Carolyn DuBois, and Christos Zografos, “Conflicts at Sea between Artisanal and Industrial Fishers: 
Inter-Sectoral Interactions and Dispute Resolution in Senegal,” Marine Policy 36, no. 6 (11, 2012): 1213. 
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crowded fishing grounds and coastal communities. Continued over-use of fisheries will 
further diminish their capacity to recover and can ultimately result in fisheries collapse.  
1.3. Dual Use of Near-shore Fisheries: Artisanal fishers’ limited vessel range 
helps mitigate competition with commercial fishers over deep sea fish, but does not 
prevent the artisanal and commercial sectors from competing over commercially viable 
near-shore fish stocks. Consistently high demand on near shore fish stocks has stressed 
the stocks into over-exploitation. Unlike deep-water fisheries that only feed commercial 
fleets, near-shore fisheries supply both commercial and artisanal needs. Coastal fisheries’ 
over-exploitation was apparent in the 1950’s and has only become more problematic.66 
Local governments have identified this as an issue, noting that many coastal fisheries are 
already severely over-exploited indicating potential fisheries collapse.67 
Growing commercial fleets increasingly fishing near-shore waters mirror the same 
trend among domestic artisanal fishers. In addition to local artisanal fishers, the numbers 
of international and domestic migratory fishers are also increasing, sharing the same waters 
with artisanal fishers and commercial fleets targeting near-shore, commercially viable 
species. The overall trend is that Africa’s historically under utilized deep sea fishing 
grounds as well as its more heavily exploited near-shore fisheries are seeing significant 
increases across all fishing sectors. Since the 1960’s African fisheries have seen roughly a 
tenfold increase in fishing, now harvesting approximately 8 million tons of fish from 
Africa’s maritime waters per year.68 This tremendous growth is a reflection of the 
explosion in commercial fishing as well as a booming demand among the artisanal 
populations, attributed in part to an influx of migrants to the coast. 
1.4. Increased Cross-boundary Artisanal Use: Along national borders, artisanal 
fishers face the same pressures from dwindling fisheries and lack of alternative 
employments that plague other fishing communities. Unable to find alternatives or to 
66 A. I. Payne, “The Exploitation of African Fisheries,” Oikos 27, no. 3 (0, 1976): 363. 
67 Yohana L. Budeba, The Tanzanian Fisheries Sector: Challenges and Opportunities, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, September 2016: 4.  
68 André Standing, “Criminality in Africa’s Fishing Industry: A Threat to Human Security,” Africa 
Security Briefs no. 33 (06, 2017): 2. 
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subsist off of overfished waters, artisanal fishermen take to crossing international borders 
to fish in neighboring states’ fishing grounds.69 Already under pressure to enforce 
domestic fisheries regulations with insufficient resources, pursuing and prosecuting 
poaching international artisanal fishers is beyond the capacity of local or national 
enforcement agencies. International subsistence fishers’ intrusion into neighboring EEZs 
adds yet another element of pressure on fisheries that local artisanal fishers must combat 
for their livelihood. Competition for resources is not limited to artisanal fishers, however, 
as dwindling resources also affect commercial sectors vying for access to fishing grounds. 
1.5.1 Increased Legal International Use: With population growth and fisheries 
over-exploitation trends occurring throughout the world, Africa’s relatively under-utilized 
waters are increasingly attractive to commercial fishing fleets. As Africa’s economy has 
grown and worldwide fish stocks continue to plummet, the potential benefits of Africa’s 
governments authorizing foreign vessels for commercially viable deep water and near-
shore fish stocks attract ever growing numbers of foreign fleets and international fishing 
companies. Rapidly growing international fleets have contributed to the present over-
fishing of Africa’s once plentiful stocks.70 National assessments of deep-water fisheries 
identifies that they are currently fully exploited, potentially overly exploited in some 
areas.71 Further research is necessary to determine the condition of deep-water fisheries.72 
1.5.2 Increased Illegal International Use: Poorly patrolled EEZ’s are highly 
vulnerable to illegal fishing vessels that take advantage of the lack of patrols and 
enforcement off of Africa’s coasts. In the current global climate of diminishing domestic 
fish stocks, illegal international fishing vessels are increasingly exploiting Africa’s 
vulnerable resources beyond the reach of minimal maritime enforcement capabilities. The 
69 Dyhia Belhabib, Vicky W. Y. Lam, and William W. L. Cheung, “Overview of West African Fisheries 
Under Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptive Responses of the Artisanal and Industrial 
Sectors,” Marine Policy 71, (09, 2016): 22.  
70 Ibid., 15. 
71 Yohana L. Budeba, The Tanzanian Fisheries Sector: Challenges and Opportunities, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, September 2016: 4. 
72 André Standing, “Criminality in Africa’s Fishing Industry: A Threat to Human Security,” Africa 
Security Briefs no. 33 (06, 2017): 7. 
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effect of these illegal activities is both economically and environmentally detrimental, 
accounting for as much as 40% more than the annual reported catch.73 Unregulated fishing 
allows illegal fishers to exploit resources without constraint, ignoring local licensing and 
gear regulations to meet high international demand for seafood. Illegal foreign fishers have 
little vested interest in the condition of fisheries that might encourage them to fish 
responsibly to allow stocks to recover. The economic impact of lost fish and revenue is 
particularly poignant for states with poor economies and whose populations rely heavily 
on fish for subsistence.  
Available data on illegal and commercial fishing indicates the dramatic increase in 
recent years off Africa’s coasts and the pressures that the industry now faces. Illegal fishing 
is particularly problematic, and estimates for actual global fishing take are 50% higher than 
reported catches.74 In Africa, this translates to roughly 25% of all fishing being conducted 
illegally as of 2005.75 This number can safely be considered much higher given the rate of 
expansion in the fisheries industry over the last decade. Illegal fishing does not consist 
exclusively of unlicensed vessels and can include licensed fishers who misrepresent their 
vessel or catch size. Chinese fishers, responsible for approximately 2.9 million tons ($7.15 
billion) of catch off of West African coasts and 181 thousand tons ($50.5 million) off of 
East Africa’s coast per year between 2005-2011, are estimated to misrepresent their total 
catch size by up to 60% in order to reduce the cost of fishing licenses and maximize their 
profits.76 These numbers, combined with the absence of research into fisheries' health and 
use, point to staggering discrepancies and dramatic over-exploitation of rapidly dwindling 
resources that approximately 5.9 million African’s rely on.77  
                                                 
73 Vicky W.Y. Lam, William W.L. Cheung, W. Swartz, and U. R. Sumaila, “Climate Change Impacts 
on Fisheries in West Africa: Implications for Economic, Food and Nutritional Security,” African Journal of 
Marine Science 34, no. 1 (Mar 01, 2012): 106. 
74 USAID, Fishing for Food Security: The Importance of Wild Fisheries for Food Security and Nutrition 
(Washington, DC: USAID, 2016), 10. 
75 André Standing, “Criminality in Africa’s Fishing Industry: A Threat to Human Security,” Africa 
Security Briefs no. 33 (06, 2017): 5. 
76 Ibid., 6. 
77 USAID, Fishing for Food Security: The Importance of Wild Fisheries for Food Security and Nutrition 
(Washington, DC: USAID, 2016), 19. 
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1.6. Expanding Tourism: Tourism brings economic prosperity, but also presents a 
simultaneous threat to fisheries and fishing livelihoods. The demands from the tourist 
industry on the fisheries sector are manifold and illustrate the growing trend of increasing 
pressure on Africa’s maritime fisheries. Tourism requires significant infrastructure, 
specifically in desirable areas, such as beaches and shorelines. Developments along the 
coast to accommodate growing numbers of tourists threaten to push out artisanal fishers, 
while tourists’ desires for pristine waters pose similar threats to commercial fishing.78 
Construction along the water damages near-shore habitats with pollution and incursion 
from sand. Tourists also bring large appetites for seafood, demanding a constant supply to 
feed dinner plates and buffet bars. Additional strain comes from growing numbers of 
recreational fishers whose activities may not be curbed by local authorities in order to 
promote increased revenue.79 Even scuba and snorkel traffic from numerous tourists can 
physically damage corals and stress fish if not conducted responsibly. Tourists’ interests in 
fisheries cover a wide spectrum and bring new dimensions to the pressures that Africa’s 
fisheries already face. The currently growing tourism sector promises to bring vital dollars 
to local economies, but it also presents an additional player on the fisheries stage in an era 
of diminishing supply and increased demand. 
2. Decreased Supply
Overuse and high demand are only one side of the challenges that African fisheries 
face. Environmental changes, brought on by climate change, destructive fishing practices, 
and pollution present additional pressures on Africa’s fisheries. Factors unrelated to the 
fisheries industry, such as mining and resource extraction, contribute to pollution and 
environmental stress that reduce fishery health. As environmental degradation increases, 
habitats and fisheries’ ability to recover from stresses and overuse decrease. This collection 
of destructive factors has severely diminished Africa’s once plentiful coastal and offshore 
78 Jackie Sunde, and Moenieba Isaacs, Marine Conservation and Coastal Communities: Who Carries 
the Costs? A Study of Marine Protected Areas and Their Impact on Traditional Small-scale Fishing 
Communities in South Africa (Chennai, India: International Collective in Support of Fishworkers, 2008), 21 
www.icsf.net 
79 Ibid., 22. 
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maritime fisheries. In an era of increasing global demand, Africa’s supply of maritime 
resources is decreasing.  
2.1. Environmental Degradation and Habitat loss: Coastal and deep-water fishery 
habitats suffer extensive degradation as a result of human activity, ranging from 
construction to mining and resource extraction. Healthy habitats are critical to maintaining 
fisheries’ health, and their degradation can adversely affect fisheries and impede their 
ability to recover from over-fishing. Highly polluting industries, such as agriculture and 
resource extraction, are critical to national economies and seldom employ environmentally 
responsible business practices.80 Near and offshore oil extraction is particularly 
destructive, involving dredging and drilling that disrupt sea floors, destroying coral reefs, 
seagrass beds, and other seafloor habitats and breeding grounds.81 Resulting pollution from 
mining and drilling operations has similar effects, killing local wildlife and reducing 
critical biodiversity. On-shore activities, such as construction and agriculture, also damage 
fisheries habitat by changing coastlines and causing polluting runoff. Agricultural runoff 
adds pollutants to fresh and marine waters that affect both habitat and wildlife.82 Pollutants 
also include sewage, especially in urban areas and cities. In urban areas with high levels of 
poverty, sewage infrastructure may be insufficient to cope with population pressures. The 
resulting pollution from sewage, agricultural and industrial runoff, and resource extraction 
degrades water conditions, killing off corals, mangrove forests, and seaweed and kelp beds 
that provide habitat for local fisheries. Habitat loss reduces available spawning areas, 
limiting the number of juvenile fish diminishing the capacity of fisheries to recover from 
heavy fishing. 
2.2. Increasing Effectiveness of Fishing Gear: Advances in technology have 
vastly improved the effectiveness of modern fishing methods, making fishing equipment 
more efficient and allowing greater catches with less effort. The results of this improved 
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efficiency is that fishers dramatically increased their fishing capacity and have exceeded 
the ability of the fishery to replenish. Fewer modern fishers can now extract more fish with 
less effort than traditional methods would allow. Such improvements have benefitted 
artisanal fishers by allowing them to fish shorter hours, but have also resulted in fishing 
capacity that exceeds the ability of fisheries to recover, devastating fish populations. 
Aiming at increased efficiency, some types of nets do not distinguish between adult and 
juvenile fish, catching everything in their path and wiping out entire generations of 
maturing and breeding fish.83 Other types of gear, including nets equipped with weights to 
drag along the ocean floor, are destructive to fish habitats and breeding grounds, such as 
coral reefs. Dynamite, while less technologically advanced but frequently employed, 
significantly reduces fishing effort while simultaneously wiping out large sections of 
habitat inhabited by multiple species, killing off all life in the vicinity. Such indiscriminate 
gear and fishing techniques result in high numbers of captured and killed non-target 
species, called by-catch, that go unused and reduce the biodiversity and health of fisheries. 
The overall impact of such destructive and indiscriminate gear is to reduce the total fish 
population, resulting in smaller future spawns and longer fishery recovery times, frequently 
also destroying habitat for future generations and other species. 
3. Climate Change
Africa’s maritime waters are particularly vulnerable to global climate change. 
Warm waters, such as those surrounding the majority of the continent, are expected to 
undergo significant changes as ocean temperatures continue to rise.84 These fragile waters 
are already experiencing significant changes, evident to researchers and the fisheries users 
who interact daily with the fragile environment.  
3.1. Coral Bleaching: Economic and environmental conditions throughout Africa 
place considerable strain on domestic fisheries and contribute to changing ocean climates 
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that also affect maritime fisheries. Rising ocean temperatures and ocean acidification 
caused by global climate change further contribute to drastic changes and degradation of 
Africa's fisheries. Warming waters are known to cause coral bleaching, resulting in 
widespread coral death throughout the oceans, depriving fish of habitat and spawning 
grounds, and reducing local biodiversity. Because corals are home to numerous species, 
they are attractive fishing grounds for artisanal fishers who have relied on them for 
generations. While some corals can tolerate limited temperature variations, their ability to 
adapt to changing temperatures and water conditions remains largely unknown. To date, 
coral bleaching has been observed on several occasions and locations off the coast, but it 
is only one result of warming waters.85  
3.2. Fish Migrations: In addition to affecting fish habitats, warming waters alter 
fish migrations and habitable zones as fish seek out the water temperatures for which they 
have evolved and on which they rely for spawning and early development.86  Adapted for 
specific temperature ranges, fish that require cooler waters have been found in regions 
outside their normal distribution as they seek appropriate climates. As waters warm, these 
fish migrate to cooler, southern waters, encroaching into the territories of other species. 
Similarly, tropical fish that thrive in warmer temperatures are now being found in wider 
distributions, showing up in areas that have traditionally been home to cooler temperatures 
outside of tropical ranges. These migrations create problems for both migrating fish and 
indigenous species that have remained in their traditional zones. In some cases, this 
behavior has brought species in contact with one another that have seldom or never 
interacted, creating new predator-prey relationships and competition for food and habitat. 
Several instances of such interactions in African waters have been detrimental to native 
species, which have been heavily predated or driven out of their traditional habitat by recent 
influxes of non-native species, changing predator-prey interactions in a given region.87 As 
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ocean waters continue to warm, climate migrations are likely to continue changing the 
ecology of traditional fishing grounds in unknown ways. Warming waters may also 
experience significant decreases in fish numbers as they become uninhabitable. Similarly, 
cooler, southern waters may experience significant changes in the types, diversity, 
numbers, and interactions of fauna.  
Changes brought about by species migration affect fishermen in a variety of ways. 
Invasive species may reduce the numbers of local species that fishermen target, requiring 
local fishermen to pursue new and unfamiliar alternatives. Invasive, non-native species 
may not serve as an acceptable replacement, leaving fishermen with no viable alternatives. 
In some cases, artisanal fishermen have taken to migrating in pursuit of their traditional 
species. Alternatively, fishermen may see biodiversity diminish as local species migrate 
out of their traditional range in search of cooler temperatures, reducing the total available 
fish stocks on which fishers rely. In cases of extremely unsuitable waters, species may 
migrate out of the region without an influx of migrating new, non-native species, depleting 
local marine life88 and leaving fishers with no viable fishing options.  
As fisheries change with warming waters, fishers must find ways to adapt so they 
can continue to subsist. Efforts to adapt to the changing fisheries landscapes include 
changing target species and adopting migratory fishing, enabling local fishermen to 
continue exploiting the increasingly fragile ecosystem. States and local communities must 
be prepared to contend with the possibility of conflict over diminished resources in light 
of the changing physical landscape and drastically increased demands placed on its limited 
maritime resources. 
4. Low State Capacity
The over-exploited condition of Africa’s fisheries is compounded by lack of state 
capacity. This critical factor facilitates illegal fisher’s activities and prevents effective 
regulations enforcement. Low state capacity also prevents thorough fisheries’ assessments, 
leaving significant gaps in knowledge that hinders effective management. Many African 
88 W. M. Potts, A. Gotz, and N. James, “Review of the Projected Impacts of Climate Change on Coastal 
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30 
states, which often lack sizable or sufficiently competent navies, find countering illegal 
fishing to be a significant financial burden. Some states simply lack the capacity to project 
any law enforcement so far from their own shores and are unable to curtail the increasing 
numbers of illegal fishers. As global fish stocks decline, the likelihood of illegal fishing in 
vulnerable waters like those off the coasts of many African states will only increase, adding 
yet more strain to fisheries and the relationships between fisheries users. 
4.1. Missing Data: Specific numbers indicating the decline in Africa’s fisheries 
are difficult to locate as there is very little data and few countries effectively track the 
spectrum of maritime fisheries. Fisheries data is critical to determining fisheries health 
and can be used to drive management programs, set catch limits, determine fishing 
seasons and zones. Continuing to fish without an understanding of the health of the 
fishery can lead to over-fishing and fisheries collapse. Due to limited resources, most 
research focuses on those fisheries with the most potential for profit. Artisanal fishers 
undertake the majority of fishing for non-commercial, low value fish, but most research 
is conducted on high-value, commercial fisheries, leaving a significant information gap 
in a critically over-exploited sector.89 Tanzania is one example of the gap in data, 
specifically for marine statistics. Catch per vessel is recorded for inland waters as 
falling from 11 tons per vessel per year down to 6-7 tons per vessel over the period of 
14 years.90 However, data on maritime resources is far less precise, with total vessel 
numbers provided as an estimation of 7,664 and no data provided regarding annual catch 
per vessel. There is some data on total annual catch during the same 14 year period 
tracked earlier, indicating that total catch has fluctuated between 43-55k tons of fish, 
despite an increase in total fishing vessels.91 This relatively stable amount in light of a 
growing fleet suggests that total catch per vessel has fallen in the maritime sector as 
well. Despite the absent information on artisanal fishing sectors, illegal fishing is more 
closely tracked. 
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4.2 Limited Enforcement Capabilities: The rural nature of many of Africa’s fishing 
communities puts them outside the reach of enforcement agencies operating on limited 
budgets and with minimal personnel. In many of these rural communities, educating 
fishermen about illegal practices presents a challenge to understaffed and underfunded 
enforcement programs. As a result of their inaccessibility and insufficient enforcement 
officers, many fishermen are simply unaware of regulatory laws or the justification behind 
their instatement. In some states, over 40% of fishermen unaware of any fishing 
regulations, while others who knew of the regulations had little if any knowledge of what 
they consisted or of how it would be applicable to them.92 Areas where regulations are 
known and reported suffer from insufficient enforcement officials and patrols.93 Infrequent 
patrols enable regulations violators, even on occasions when such violations are reported. 
Damage caused to fisheries and habitats by illegal and destructive gear compounds the 
growing problem of fisheries overuse. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Across the continent, Africa’s fisheries are facing increasing stresses as growing 
demand and changing environment affect their health and sustainability. Increasing global 
demand is motivating foreign countries to turn to Africa’s waters in search of new fishing 
grounds at the same time that population growth and migration are adding to local 
demands. Lacking sufficient enforcement capabilities to monitor vast coastlines and 
waters, many African states are unable to prevent illegal fishing from depleting once-
plentiful resources. This combination of factors has pushed many coastal and deep-water 
fisheries into over-use. Without effective monitoring and management programs, fisheries 
run the risk of proceeding from over-use into fisheries collapse.  
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III. INSECURITIES, CONFLICT AND MANAGEMENT  
This chapter will explore the effects of increasing pressure and diminishing supply 
within Africa’s fisheries sector, examining how this dynamic can lead to conflict. It will 
also evaluate means of managing fisheries resources to mitigate depletion and conflict. 
The previous chapter revealed the strains within Africa’s fisheries sector and the 
high demands that have reduced fisheries from abundant to over-utilized. Increasing users 
have depleted once plentiful fisheries and place users in competition with one another. The 
roots of this competition are based on both economics and food security. Africa’s fisheries 
are a critical source of food, providing roughly 25% of Africa’s animal protein 
consumption, and their vulnerability causes insecurity that poses a direct threat to local 
communities.94 Users, both commercial and artisanal, resort to conflict to protect critical 
resources and defend their livelihoods. Because rural fishing communities are particularly 
dependent on fisheries, when those fisheries become depleted, they are at particularly high 
risk of experiencing low-level conflict.95 This chapter will outline the various types of 
conflict seen among fisheries users. It will look at conflict as seen between the individual 
participants, describing how conflict most often manifests.   
However, although users may be driven to conflict as they seek resolution and a 
means of subsistence, this does not have to be their only option.96 Fisheries management 
programs support sustainable fishing practices and can help mitigate or reduce existing 
conflict over dwindling resources. Effective management is critical to fisheries’ 
sustainability and this chapter will examine what role specific management strategies play 
in both promoting sustainable fishing practices and reducing conflict. This chapter will 
look specifically at two types of management programs: national management, run by the 
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national government, and co-management programs that incorporate local level input and 
enforcement. It will examine each in turn, looking at advantages and disadvantages for 
each. 
A. TYPES OF CONFLICT 
Somalian piracy is the most famous example of fisheries conflict, in which local 
fishermen took extreme measures to protect their livelihoods and source of food. One 
estimate places the cost of the illegal fishing at approximately $450 million and that over 
800 illegal vessels were identified in Somali waters in 2005.97 Somali fishers’ response in 
defense of their livelihoods ballooned into a thriving piracy industry that affected global 
trade. In response, the international community formed a multinational military force to 
combat the pirates that caused numerous civilian casualties and cost the world economy 
approximately $18 billion annually.98 Although Somalia’s pirates may represent the most 
extreme example of conflict evolving from poorly managed fisheries, they are not 
representative of the majority of Africa’s fisheries.  
Most conflict manifests at a low-level, staying well below the attention of the state. 
In cases where law enforcement is involved, it consists of the community or local level and 
does not involve military intervention. Conflict itself consists most frequently of sabotage 
to boats, gear, or property, boat ramming, bribery, threats, or intentional exclusion from 
fishing zones. There are few reports of assault or murder, though some more violent cases 
are documented. For example, Senegal identified twelve deaths and seven casualties 
blamed on conflict between fisheries users in two regions during the four-year period 
between 1988 and 1992.99 While no details are available to shed light on these incidents, 
they are an indication of higher-level conflict surrounding fisheries competition, but still 
fall well short of qualifying as armed conflicts. For the sake of this paper, conflict will 
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include acts of sabotage, bribery, threats, intentional exclusion, and destruction of physical 
property. The following sections identify the varying types of competition and conflict, 
among African fishers. 
1. Commercial Fishers Competing with Artisanal Fishers 
Competition between commercial and artisanal sectors over traditionally artisanal 
species can occur in states that have both a large artisanal fishing sector and commercially 
viable near-shore fisheries, such as lobster, abalone, or sea urchins. It can lead to depleted 
fisheries and low-level conflict, illustrating the importance of the clash between 
commercial interests and artisanal livelihoods. Subsistence fishers, threatened by the 
incursion of significantly larger and more efficient commercial fishers, complain to local 
authorities when commercial vessels make incursions into reserved areas or damage 
artisanal fishers’ gear.100 Local fishermen are unable to compete with the technology 
available on commercial vessels that artisanal fishermen complain depletes local fish 
leaving nothing behind.101 Commercial vessels engaging in conflict may be licensed by 
the state to legally operate in the same waters as artisanal fishers. However, competition 
reduces their own catch and reduces profits. Low-level conflict between commercial and 
artisanal vessels often manifests as sabotage, bribery, and poaching. 
The majority of conflicts appear to originate from commercial vessels targeting 
artisanal vessels and gear in an effort to reduce competition and maximize catch. Despite 
the same pressures facing artisanal fishers, very little data points to conflict from them 
toward commercial vessels. Many artisanal fishermen report that commercial fishers resort 
to aggressive measures to mitigate competition and maximize their catch in crowded 
waters, going so far as to destroy artisanal fishers’ boats and gear.102 To avoid fishing 
outside their prescribed areas, commercial fishers may bribe artisanal fishers to fish in 
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restricted zones, or stay away from areas where commercial vessels operate.103 This eases 
competition for commercial fishers and prevents potential legal disputes between 
commercial vessels and law enforcement. However, insufficient enforcement or politically 
vested interest in commercial activities prevents authorities from enforcing zoning on 
commercial vessels or otherwise taking action against them.104  
2. Migrant Fishers vs. Local Artisanal 
Population growth in fishing communities and the resulting increased demand on 
fisheries has strained the critical resource to the point where competing users resort to 
destruction and conflict to protect their livelihood. In many communities, competition for 
fishing access spreads to migratory fishers. This influx places local fishermen in opposition 
to perceived outsiders in competition for limited resources. The rapid expansion in resource 
users as migration grows has coincided with “a rapid increase in fishing effort…as well as 
low or non-compliance to management regulations, destructive fishing practices, and 
resource use conflicts.”105 While the majority of interactions are peaceful, conflict arises 
when migrants come in contact with local fishers already struggling with declining stocks. 
Local fishermen object to the presence of migrant fishermen who are perceived as more 
aggressive fishers and who use more efficient gear.106 The response on the part of local 
fishers consists of intentional exclusion or low-level violence.107 Some communities 
refuse to allow migrants access to local fisheries due to severely diminished numbers of 
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fish.108 Communities with high levels of new migrants have documented higher rates of 
civil unrest and communal discord.109 Despite reports of growing conflict and unrest 
between the groups, there are few specifics as to the types or numbers of conflict taking 
place. In spite of insufficient data, it is clear that encroaching migrants fishers threaten local 
fishermen and hostilities between local and migrant fishers have been documented with 
increasing frequency.110 
3. Tourism vs. Artisanal 
Tourist industry and infrastructure poses a direct threat to artisanal fishers’ access 
to traditional fishing grounds. As tourism expands and lays claim to ever increasing 
stretches of waterfront, tourist demands for pristine beaches, reefs, and sport fishing push 
artisanal fishers out and threaten food security. Artisanal fishers feel that the increasing 
tourism sector is pushing them out of traditional and critical fishing areas.111 African states 
with poor economies offer little relief for artisanal fishers looking for alternative 
employment, making competition over potential new tourist areas critical. In response to 
the tourism threat, some artisanal fishers’ have taken to acts of vandalism. Trespassing 
against hotels and tourist properties to access fishing grounds is another common tactic. In 
response, tourist facilities have attempted to ban artisanal fishers or report them to local 
authorities. Conflict between these two groups remains at a low level, limited to minor 
vandalism, trespassing, and involving local level enforcement without escalating higher. 
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However, as the tourist industry grows, the frequency of conflict between these two sectors 
also increases.112  
4. Illegal vs. Legal Fishers 
Illegal fishers are difficult to classify and identify as they are often legal fishers 
participating in illegal activities such as deliberately exceeding their authorized catch, 
fishing outside of designated fishing zones, or allowing their licenses to lapse. For this 
reason, identifying conflict between legal and illegal fishers is difficult. Incidents of 
conflict may also fall within other categories, such as commercial versus artisanal conflict, 
due to the fact that they often fall within more than one category and the challenges with 
identifying illegal vessels. Illegal fishers may fall within any category, to include 
commercial or artisanal, domestic or foreign. In South Africa, illegal fishers are often 
artisanal fishers who conflict with state enforcement authorities. Many illegal fishers in 
Somali waters are international commercial vessels operating unlicensed and unregulated 
within Somalia’s EEZ. Regardless of which group they fall under, illegal fishers’ activities 
affect all groups and are highly detrimental to the sustainability of Africa’s fisheries and 
fishing sector. 
Illegal fishing constitutes 25% of fishing in Africa and conflicts indirectly with 
other sectors by depriving them of their share of fisheries resources.113 Preventing illegal 
fishing poses significant challenges, as many states cannot provide the tools necessary to 
patrol distant offshore waters, which are left open to exploitation. Similar problems with 
insufficient enforcement allow illegal fishers to operate closer to shore, conflicting with 
both legal commercial and artisanal fishers. Conflict with the illegal fishing sector is 
complicated by the variety of forms that it takes. Many instances of illegal commercial 
vessels participating in conflict are described in the commercial versus artisanal section, 
when otherwise legal commercial vessels participate in illegal activities, such as fishing 
outside of authorized regions. Frequently, illegal commercial vessels go undetected as they 
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operate in unpatrolled waters, or go unidentified because they carry legitimate licenses, but 
for the wrong class of vessel, different fishing zones, or expired licenses.  
Illegal vessels may only be identified as such if they are caught, either by port 
authorities or occasional enforcement patrols. Many illegal fishers go unnoticed, failing to 
report total catch or fishing in unauthorized waters without being caught. One significant 
factor characterizing illegal fishers that affects all other users is the extent to which they 
degrade conditions for legal fishers across all sectors. Illegal fishing accounts for 
significant financial loss per year and is responsible for extensive ecological damage 
through unsustainable or destructive practices. Nonetheless, while the effects of illegal 
fishing are relatively well documented, few accounts of conflict with identified illegal 
fishers exist.  
Conflict between fisheries users is predominantly low-level, with a few notable 
exceptions. Apparent among all fisheries users, conflict takes various forms ranging from 
equipment and vessel sabotage, to territorial incursions. Considering current heavy and 
expanding use, incidents of conflict are likely to increase in both frequency and severity. 
While still low-level, conflict may escalate as fisheries degradation worsens and dependent 
fishers face lost revenues, unemployment, and food shortages. Poor enforcement while 
incidents of conflict are still low level will allow conflict to continue and possibly escalate 
until state involvement becomes essential. Effective fisheries management will becoming 
increasingly important to ensure that growing numbers of users retain peaceful access to 
this critical resource.   
Africa’s maritime fisheries host a diverse assortment of commercial and non-
commercial, legal and illegal users. Conflict between groups manifests in areas where 
interaction and competition between users is frequent and enforcement capabilities are 
limited. However, despite the number of users and their varying degrees of legality, conflict 
is seldom occurs above the local level. Even in areas of high competition, conflict is most 
often limited to bribery, boat ramming, or destruction of property. In very few cases have 
higher-level conflict, such as murder, been reported. Despite the expectation that artisanal 
fishers would most often instigate conflict due to their higher numbers and reliance on 
fishing as both a food and income source, most cases of conflict are initiated by commercial 
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fishers. Moreover, fisheries management has proven to be a means through which fisheries 
conflict may be reduced. 
B. FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
Effective state management can help mitigate fisheries conflict between users through a 
variety of measures. Management is critical to ensure that fisheries users retain access and 
that fisheries themselves maintain sustainable levels. This section will present two primary 
forms of management, national and co-management, that are widely employed across 
Africa. Both types attempt to control legal and illegal fishing through laws, regulations, 
and enforcement, with varying degrees of success. Although effective fisheries 
management reduces competition and conflict when employed, all types are not equally 
effective. Each management style has advantages and disadvantages for both communities 
and the state that are more clearly apparent with an in depth look at how each has been 
employed. However, as the case studies demonstrate, co-management has proven more 
effective in incorporating local level involvement and reducing conflict between 
communities and the state.  
Fisheries management programs are intended to enforce fisheries regulations to 
ensure sustainable use, conserve fisheries for continued production, and protect maritime 
resources. These goals are met through a variety of measures implemented either by state 
authorities through national management or local communities through co-management, 
depending on which program is active in a given area. Management goals and enforcement 
measures play a significant role in controlling conflict among users and can reduce conflict 
when effectively employed. Licensing commercial and artisanal fishers, creating protected 
or restricted areas, fishing seasons, catch limits, and fines are all measures that both types 
of management employ to ensure compliance among fisheries users. These methods meet 
with varying degrees of success depending on the type of management in place and the role 
of local communities within the program.  
1. National Management 
The first approach to fisheries management occurs on the national level. This type 
of management centralizes responsibility for imposing and enforcing regulations, as well 
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as all domestic and international licensing, fisheries data collection, and maritime patrol 
activities, within the central state under one or several departments.114 This top-down 
management strategy places costs of enforcing maritime laws within the state’s 
responsibility and leads small communities to expect government resources to provide 
management and protection for fisheries.115 Centralized management is employed by 
states around the world and by many within Africa. However, this approach has not been 
very successful in Africa, for three reasons.  
First, many African states find the costs of enforcing maritime laws within their 
EEZs to be a severe financial burden, exacerbated by poor governance and corruption.116 
In a continent as vast as Africa, which boasts vast remote and sparsely populated areas, 
states simply lack the financial and personnel resources to ensure that effective patrols and 
regulations enforcement take place. Unable to afford the costs of purchasing, equipping, 
manning, and maintaining patrol vessels or port authorities, much of their maritime domain 
remains unmonitored and vulnerable to illegal fishing activities.  
A second drawback of national management is that the remoteness and 
inaccessibility of many fishing communities cause additional personnel challenges. Similar 
to the cost of maintaining maritime patrol vessels, employing sufficient enforcement 
officers to cover extensive and remote territory is not financially feasible. As a result, states 
that utilize centralized management have vast maritime areas that are vulnerable to illegal 
or overfishing.117 On shore, lack of regulation translates into unreported and underreported 
catch, frequently seen among licensed commercial vessels, as well as unauthorized gear 
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use.118 Current estimates place the actual total catch in fisheries around the world are 50% 
higher than reported catch.119 In Africa, the disparity between actual and reported catch is 
the result of a combination of corruption and ineffective or unenforced fisheries 
regulations, which undermines current management efforts and costs approximately $1 
billion in lost revenue, as of 2005.120 Programs intended to mitigate overfishing and 
protect habitat cannot be effectively enforced in areas where enforcement officers are not 
present. 
Third, state-based management also runs the risk of implementing programs that 
fail to consider local needs and expectations. Subsistence fishing communities rely on a 
readily available source of fish, which may conflict with the state’s attempts to limit or 
manage fishing activities.121 Communities are more likely to comply with regulations 
when they feel that their needs are being represented and who have a better understanding 
of the justification for state management.122 Programs designed to help fisheries recover 
from overuse may limit local fishers’ access by creating non-fishing zones, restricting 
seasonal access, establishing marine parks, or banning certain types of fishing gear. 
Protected areas where fishing is banned encourage local fishers to relocate and overstress 
nearby non-protected areas.123 Communities may perceive these actions as the state cutting 
locals off from traditional fishing grounds or imposing unrealistic regulations in an effort 
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to dispossess artisanal fishers of their livelihoods, creating conflict between fishers and 
administrative authorities.124  
Despite widespread use throughout Africa, national management has largely failed 
to create the desired results and poses significant challenges to both governments and 
resource users that make it ineffective. Recognizing this, many African countries are 
beginning to implement decentralization, granting more authority to local communities and 
allowing them to participate more fully in fisheries management.125 These countries, 
including Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa are adopting an alternative approach 
to fisheries management: co-management. 
2. Co-management 
Decentralization and co-management are growing trends that incorporate local 
level input and enforcement in policy creation and management.126 Recently, the World 
Bank has been active in promoting programs across Africa that incorporate local level 
participation in management and decision-making in an effort to improve fisheries 
management and governance and combat illegal fishing.127 These programs often consist 
of co-management strategies whereby the local community enforces regulations but 
operate with oversight from the national government.128 Co-management programs have 
seen improved adherence to state-mandated regulations and help improve regulations 
enforcement in remote areas that are difficult for thinly spread enforcement officers to 
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access.129 These programs have the added benefit of allowing affected communities to 
participate in the management of the resource on which they rely. By incorporating local 
interests, the state is able to pass policies that allow continued access while also helping 
promote sustainable conservation programs that the community can understand and 
facilitate. 
Additionally, local level participation helps ensure that affected communities have 
a vested interest in the success of the management program. Combining management with 
local existing reliance on resources encourages communities to become more active 
participants in both enforcing regulations among other users and following regulations 
themselves. This is one complaint that local villagers have against migrant fishers, arguing 
that migrant fishers lack any connection or reliance on local resources, allowing them to 
disregard conservative fishing methods.130  
Catch share programs are one means of including local communities in resource 
management efforts and provide incentives to fish more responsibly and abide by fishery 
regulations by tying individual catches to fishery population levels. Growing numbers of 
developing countries and wealthier nations are employing these programs, as are 
community managed programs. These programs grant fishers a total allowable catch 
(TAC) that is a set percentage of the local fishery. As the fishery grows and stabilizes, the 
TAC also increases, improving fishers’ catch and return.131 In Alaska in the 1990s, local 
fishermen were critical in helping the severely diminished halibut fishery recover after 
being authorized a TAC in place of the traditional limited season.132 Understanding that 
their own catch would increase as the local stocks grew, fishermen altered their tactics and 
seasons to encourage fishery growth, choosing to set management regulations that 
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exceeded those imposed by the state to ensure more rapid fishery growth. In some areas 
where catch share has been implemented, fishers have even requested reduced TACs to 
accommodate fishery recovery.133  
Similarly, when local communities in Africa have a role in managing a critical local 
resource, they take a more active role in promoting and participating in management. Local 
fishermen encouraged to help with enforcement are instrumental in reporting illegal 
activities and are more willing to comply with regulations that they feel represent their own 
interests.134 Understanding the purpose behind management programs is critical to local 
participation and requires local level education on practices and policies. 
Many national management programs struggle as a result of lack of education, poor 
understanding of the purpose for the program, specific rules, and regulations. Artisanal 
fishermen who either do not know or do not understand regulations are less able or willing 
to comply. In contrast, local level participation can facilitate education about management 
practices and their justification, increasing the likelihood of their success. Because 
enforcement falls to the local community, whose needs and interests help determine aspects 
of local management, a clearer understanding of the specific laws is both necessary and 
more widespread.135 Fishermen who understand the justification behind prohibited gear 
and who benefit from improved fishery health are more likely to comply with gear 
regulations and to report violators. Empowering the local community through education 
and enforcement further improves program success by expanding capacity into regions the 
state has difficulty reaching.  
In addition, local level participation in co-management facilitates regulation 
enforcement in remote regions that the state otherwise has difficulty accessing. Through 
co-management, communities ensure that members of remote areas and migrant fishers 
adhere to regulations that promote the health of the local fishery and the community itself. 
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Some communities include local fishermen in patrolling and enforcement, establishing 
local units to patrol for and report regulations violations.136 Hotels have also been 
instrumental in reporting illegal fishing activities, helping overextended local enforcement 
officers and local management programs. In Tanzania, local hotels whose business depends 
on pristine corals, beaches and plentiful fisheries to attract tourists have become active 
participants in enforcement.137 Co-management programs have helped mitigate conflict 
between sectors by sharing both responsibility and benefits of local fisheries’ health. 
Despite the benefits of fisheries co-management programs, problems have been 
identified with their implementation. Mitigating inter-group conflict is one of the driving 
factors behind promoting co-management. In areas where such conflict exists, local 
fishermen are often critical players in fisheries dynamics. Granting these individuals and 
their communities key roles in management can lead to the further exclusion of fisheries 
users from outside the controlling community, resulting in disproportionate access and 
increased discontent. The case of migrant fishers is one such example. Local level 
management in some areas has shown that migratory fishers’ interests receive less 
consideration when the local community plays a larger role in management.138 Fishing 
licenses may be denied, catch limits severely reduced, fishing zones relocated or reduced, 
denying non-local fishermen access to fisheries. In Mozambique, one community reduced 
the authorized length of stay for migrant fishers and established non-migrant fishing zones 
to reduce the group’s access.139 This dynamic can create conflict between the persecuted 
group and the local management community, potentially fomenting regional tensions. 
Migrant fishers have simply stopped visiting some locations, easing pressure in that area 
but increasing the burden on other communities. While similar actions could be taken 
against commercial vessels or tourism, state support for the revenue producing industries 
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may be sufficient to prevent such local level efforts.140 Continued strain on resources from 
increasing numbers of users will doubtless cause some conflict even with community 
participation in management.141 Although co-management offers a promising alternative 
approach, some communities may view their increased management role as an opportunity 
to restrict the access of other rightful fisheries users.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Conflict between groups manifests as competition for dwindling fisheries resources 
increases. Although various groups are in competition with one another, conflict has 
remained well below the national level, involving local actors and dealt with at the local 
level. Overall, conflict is not currently a significant security threat, for locals, African 
states, or the international community. But, growing pressure on fisheries could quickly 
escalate the problem. As such, it is critical to thoroughly understand the effects of 
management programs on fisheries user and potential conflict to prevent future crises over 
resource use.  
States seeking to effectively manage their maritime fisheries resources have 
employed two types of management programs: national management and co-management. 
Many states opt for national management as a means of retaining state control over 
fisheries resources, licensing, and enforcement. However, the economic and enforcement 
resources necessary to effectively manage are often beyond the capability of impoverished 
and inefficient governments. Local communities view methods employed in ensuring 
compliance with management programs with suspicion and contempt, taking advantage of 
poor infrastructure and capacity to fish illegally. Co-management offers an inexpensive 
means for state governments to expand their management programs without imposing the 
staggering costs that can be incurred by attempting to govern lengthy and remote 
coastlines. 
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While reducing conflict, effective enforcement can also promote healthy fisheries. 
One Liberian fishing zone reserved exclusively for small-scale fishers reports that the 
fishery has been able to recover and produce better quality fish, helping ensure the survival 
of the local economy and subsistence fishing community, and lending credence to local 
concerns about commercial fishers.142 This development came to pass only when the 
Liberian government employed a co-management program with local communities in an 
effort to combat illegal fishing and improve fishery health. The program worked in 
conjunction with government patrols to enforce fishing regulations and bans.143 The whole 
project was carried out as a collaborative effort with funding from several NGOs.   The 
results have shown an increase in fishery productivity, helped the Liberian government 
increase revenues from commercial fisheries, and reduced the incidents of illegal 
fishing.144 However, economically underdeveloped states are less able to field the 
resources required to effectively manage vast fisheries that can be a tremendous boon to a 
country’s economy. Effective management programs that promote sustainable fisheries 
could add $2 billion to Africa’s economies per year, making sustainable management an 
effective tool in improving state and local economies.145 In this capacity, local 
communities can be powerful actors in maritime resources management and conflict 
prevention if the state works with communities to establish effective co-management 
programs.  
The following case studies will look at an example of each type of management 
program, providing an illustration of how each management type can influence fishery 
productivity and the resulting competition and conflict. These case studies will demonstrate 
that co-management programs are more effective in meeting management goals than 
national management programs. 
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IV. TANZANIA CASE STUDY 
Fisheries are a critical resource in Tanzania, providing 183,800 jobs throughout the 
country and provide up to 22 percent of animal protein to local diets.146 Recently, fisheries 
have seen increasing competition between the artisanal and commercial sectors as global 
demand for fish continues to rise. Adding to this domestic competition, Tanzania’s tourism 
sector is now growing as the world begins to appreciate what the country has to offer. 
Fisheries have noticeably decreased over the last 10 years, leading to voiced concerns from 
traditional fishers, who utilize local, near shore fisheries for critical food resources, as well 
as from commercial fisheries who contribute significantly to the Tanzanian GDP. In an 
economy where multiple resource users rely on local fisheries for income, food, and 
employment, the health of now over-stressed stocks is crucial to countless households and 
communities, as well as to the health of the national economy.  
As multiple competing sectors increasingly interact with one another, competition 
has occasionally turned to conflict, primarily in the form of sabotage, boat ramming, and 
destruction of fishing gear. In response to both the diminishing fisheries and increasingly 
strained interactions between users, the Tanzanian government has enacted a variety of 
changes in their approach to fisheries management, creating numerous maritime reserves 
intended to help preserve sustainable fish stocks to meet the needs of all parties involved. 
Effective resource management strategies are critical to reducing the potential for conflict 
between increasing numbers of resource users seeking access to diminishing fisheries 
stocks within Tanzania’s coastal waters and EEZ. The Tanzanian government was 
proactive in recognizing the danger posed by increased pressure on fisheries, implementing 
management programs before that mitigated the potential for significant conflict.  
A. THE STATUS OF TANZANIA’S FISHERIES 
Tanzania has moved in recent years to promote its maritime industries, including 
commercial fisheries. Tanzania’s maritime fishing industry makes up only 14 percent of 
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the total fish production for the country, with over 85 percent of production coming from 
inland sources.147 However, the maritime sector also employs numerous artisanal 
fishermen distributed across approximately 7,666 vessels and growing at a rate of roughly 
280 vessels per year.148 The number of large, domestic commercial vessels is significantly 
smaller and consists of three large longliners and 74 commercial domestic and international 
vessels.149 While the percentage of the maritime fisheries’ intake is far lower than that of 
inland fisheries, the sector is still a significant contributor to local employment and diets 
and is growing steadily each year. The maritime fisheries industry contributes roughly 2 
percent per year to the GDP, with a recent drop down to 1.4 percent in 2014, but makes up 
approximately 10 percent of national exports.150 This critical sector has become 
increasingly important as Tanzania’s tourism industry grows, attracting visitors from 
around the world who seek to enjoy the country’s fisheries through recreational activities. 
Tanzania’s fishing industry consists of both domestic commercial and artisanal 
fishing sectors. The commercial sector primarily fishes further out in the EEZ and targets 
internationally marketable fish such as tuna, swordfish, skipjack and marlin, but also 
utilizes fisheries closer to shore in pursuit of crabs, lobster, octopus, shrimp and squid that 
are also targeted by artisanal fishermen.151 Commercial fishers contribute to the national 
economy through a variety of means, including employment of fishers out on fishing 
vessels, and fish processing workers on land, as well as through domestic and international 
export sales. Domestic commercial fishing vessels share deep-sea resources with 
international ships that have signed agreements with the government of Tanzania to fish 
within its EEZ. 
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Small scale and subsistence fishers make up a large artisanal fishers sector. The 
artisanal and small-scale fishers exploit resources much closer to shore due to limitations 
imposed by their much smaller boats and more primitive equipment.152 While not 
contributing as significantly to the national export economy, maritime artisanal fishing 
does supply fresh fish directly to local markets and accounts for approximately 14 percent 
of the total national fisheries production.153 In addition to individual and household 
incomes, this sector provides a critical food source to many families and communities who 
may not have access to commercial catch due to remoteness or low income. Commercial 
pursuits for the small scale and artisanal fisher sector are limited as a result of difficult and 
lengthy transportation to markets and limited availability of refrigeration, which is critical 
to keeping fish fresh during transport through the hot climate found across Tanzania.154 
As a result, these fishers rely on resources close to home, and what commercial 
opportunities they have are limited to local markets.  
Tourism across Tanzania is a relatively new player in the maritime fisheries sector 
that is actively promoted by the Tanzanian government and has been growing rapidly, 
nearly doubling in eight years from $824 million to $1.4 billion between 2005 and 2013.155 
Marine resources, including beaches, coral reefs and fisheries, are popular attractions for 
the growing numbers of tourists who visit annually. As this industry expands, it adds more 
users with diverse interests to the growing list of groups who vie for fisheries and maritime 
resources. The tourist industry has a vested interest in pristine conditions that appeal to 
visitors for a variety of activities, including scuba diving, snorkeling, and deep sea sport 
fishing. The varied interests of the tourist industry put it in close competition with both the 
artisanal and commercial sectors for resource access near shore as well as further out in the 
EEZ. 
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Further competition for fishing grounds comes from the international community 
in the form of foreign commercial fishing fleets. Already competing with the domestic 
commercial fishing vessels, artisanal fishers now face pressure from international fleets as 
well. In 2014, 25 international fishing vessels were licensed by the Tanzanian government 
to fish within its EEZ, per agreements signed with Spain, France, Seychelles, and South 
Korea, among others.156 Increasing global demands for seafood and dwindling local 
fisheries drive many international commercial fishers to Africa’s coastlines where 
resources are abundant in comparison with their own, overfished territorial waters. Typical 
traditional boats are unable to compete with large, international trawlers and local 
fishermen “have been pushed out of their traditional fishing grounds by the huge 
vessels.”157 Given that many local fishermen are subsistence fishers, this competition 
creates the potential for food insecurity as well as economic strife. 
In at least one documented case, commercial fishers have actively encouraged local 
fishermen to fish illegally in prohibited areas and have even provided them with the 
equipment to do so.158 While this is not an illustration of conflict between the two groups, 
it does demonstrate the severity of diminishing resources. Encouraging local fishers to 
move into prohibited areas serves the short-term goal of temporarily lessening competition 
in the immediate authorized vicinity, making it easier for commercial fishers to catch their 
limit. The commercial fishers take no risk of getting caught violating fishing regulations 
and manage to reduce competition for resources. This is one illustration of the competition 
between artisanal and commercial fisheries, but it demonstrates the measures that each is 
willing to take in order to ensure their own access. Mutual use agreements that enable both 
industries to utilize these resources will be critical to preventing potential conflicts. 
More frequent and intense incursions from illegal fishers, often from unlicensed 
international vessels, are having an increasingly detrimental effect on Tanzania’s fishing 
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economy. The incursions from illegal fishing vessels have become so problematic that the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (MALF) lists illegal fishing as a top 
constraint on the fisheries sector.159 In addition to stealing revenue from Tanzania’s own 
domestic fleets, illegal fishers add another layer of competitive pressure to an already tense 
race for limited fish stocks. Illegal fishing also places a heavy financial strain on the state 
itself as law enforcement attempts to rein in the illegal incursions into Tanzania’s EEZ. 
The state is forced to expend valuable and limited resources patrolling waters for illegal 
fishers that could be directed toward conservation or regulations enforcement within its 
own domestic fishing sectors. 
B. COMPETITION AND CONFLICT 
The interplay of these varied actors becomes problematic and strained as they all 
seek access to the same limited resources. Artisanal fishers feel that their access to near-
shore fisheries is a right guaranteed by traditional, historic access that gives them 
precedence over other users. This perspective puts them in conflict with newer resource 
users, such as the tourism industry, as it purchases beachfront properties with access to 
traditional fishing grounds, such as coral reefs and mangrove forests. Artisanal and 
domestic commercial fisheries come into conflict as commercial fishers target resources 
that artisanal fishers rely on for subsistence and income. The complex interests of each 
sector create tensions as the growing groups compete for economic relevance and resource 
access. 
Despite the increasing strains from more users and dwindling stocks, few specific 
conflicts between resource users have been documented. Those that have been identified 
remain at low levels and are most often seen in instances where access has been completely 
denied to historic resource users. A general increase in overall conflict between resource 
users has been found as more users from different backgrounds, such as tourists and 
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artisanal fishers, compete for the same fisheries.160 One documented instance of conflict 
between users consists of an island hotel development project in Tanzania that denied local 
fishermen any access to traditional fishing grounds, including the island and surrounding 
waters. As a result of this complete denial of access, local fishermen subsequently and 
consistently vandalized the property to the extent that the project was sold. The purchaser, 
recognizing the importance of maintaining good relations with the community, was able to 
reach an agreement with the local fishermen whereby their access to both the island and 
the fishing grounds was restored and the hotel retained use of the resources for guests.161 
Following this mutual use agreement, the vandalism stopped and no further incidents were 
reported.  
This case is significant in suggesting that conflict between groups is more likely to 
occur when traditional users have been completely denied access to resources. The conflict 
between the developer and the fishermen was resolved and vandalism ceased even though 
access would be shared and was more limited to the fishermen than it had been prior to the 
development of the hotel. So long as some level of access was available, this particular 
community of local fishermen appears to have been amenable to sharing resources. While 
the implications of this particular case are pertinent, more documented instances of such 
conflict are needed to determine causes and potential mitigation.  
Other cases of conflict consist of equipment vandalism between commercial and 
artisanal fishermen as well as among users from the same communities.162 In these cases, 
complaints were taken to the local management authority with evidence that fishing had 
been nearly depleted since the arrival of trawlers onto traditional grounds.163 Many 
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disputes appear at the low level and are accompanied by complaints to local officials, who 
also rely on zoning to mitigate conflicts between users.164 The use of official channels to 
register complaints suggests that there is some degree of effective enforcement that locals 
feel they can rely on. This avenue for conflict resolution is an indicator that management 
and enforcement mechanisms are both understood by local users and are considered 
reasonably effective. Beyond complaints and low-level conflict, there is no readily 
available documentation of conflict escalating to physical violence either among fishers or 
between sectors.  
Tourists, commercial, and traditional fishers are not the only ones competing for 
valuable maritime resources. The combined pressures from multiple resource users has 
become readily apparent to all parties involved in the form of severely diminished fisheries 
stocks. Local fishermen report having to expend much more effort in return for smaller 
catches and studies confirming significantly reduced abundance in the last decade 
corroborate their complaints.165 Communities also report increasing numbers of fishers 
from both the local area and beyond, resulting in further strain on the fisheries themselves, 
as well as more competition for dwindling resources.166 In some areas, the combined 
factors of diminished fisheries and influx of new fisheries users are found to be eroding 
social bonds, resulting in tensions and suspicion within previously close-knit 
communities.167 These social tensions within small communities point to potential for 
greater social conflict and insecurity as resource users continue to increase while resources 
themselves continue to dwindle. Effective management policies will prove critical to 
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prevent conflict as tensions within and between fisheries users and sectors continue to 
escalate in the face of declining stocks. 
C. MANAGEMENT 
Tanzania’s government has begun to implement co-management programs in some 
areas in an effort to conserve its maritime resources and ensure that sufficient resources are 
available for fisheries users. In recent years, it has dedicated significant portions of its 
coastline and EEZ to Maritime Protected Areas (MPAs) and has future plans for more. The 
goal behind establishing these protected areas is to provide habitat in areas critical to 
indigenous fish, such as spawning areas and coral reefs, to promote sustainable fisheries. 
This program is intended to ensure continued use of maritime resources for all invested 
parties without causing fisheries to collapse or to fall into commercial extinction. If 
sustainable numbers can be maintained, resource competition between users will be eased 
and potential for tensions and conflict mitigated.  
The challenge that the government faces is how to regulate these areas so that 
sustainability is ensured and regulations are obeyed. Like many African coastal countries, 
Tanzania has many communities in remote areas that are difficult for national enforcement 
officers and vessels to reach, making enforcement costly and difficult for nationally 
managed programs. MALF’s attempts to completely close MPAs to all extractive activity 
resulted in an increase in regulations violations, illegal fishing, and poaching, testing the 
limits of national enforcement capabilities. Findings suggest that MPAs that allow some 
fishing activity experience a higher degree of compliance than those that are completely 
closed off to all fishing or resource extraction, regardless of management type, easing the 
burden of enforcing regulations and freeing up valuable assets.168 Regulations are also 
found to be most effective in areas where the community’s needs are incorporated into 
resource management.169 Similarly, co-management areas also see the lowest level of 
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hostility toward the state and lower incidents of fishers engaging in acts of sabotage against 
resource competitors.170 Conversely, areas managed exclusively by the state and closed to 
local access are perceived as solely benefitting the state, to the detriment of the local 
community.171 In accordance with these findings, the government began implementing co-
management of MPAs with local communities to allow tightly regulated access within 
previously denied areas.172 The number of violations and illegal activities dropped 
significantly even in nationally managed areas after the government opened the MPA even 
to limited resource extraction. 
Effective co-management is reinforced by an education component for local 
managers and fishers aimed at informing them of sustainability goals and practices, such 
as gear restrictions and regulations.173 Actively working to incorporate locals into planning 
and management appears to be an effective means of demonstrating that conservation 
measures are being employed for everyone’s benefit. This concept is evident in the few 
documented cases of specific conflict, which primarily arose as a result of denial of access. 
In addition to benefitting the local community in representing their needs and interests, co-
management enables the national government to defray some of the costs associated with 
management and enforcement.174 
While co-management has proven effective in reducing incidents of conflict within 
and among fishery users, there are only a few areas that implement these programs. Much 
of Tanzania’s coastline is still beyond the reach of national management programs and the 
government has yet to introduce widespread co-management programs throughout the 
country. Information regarding conflict in these areas is also limited, but destructive fishing 
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practices are considered a widespread problem outside of managed fishing areas. This 
continued trend of destructive fishing threatens the resource and could lead to increased 
incidents of conflict if effective management plans are not implemented.175 Around 2000, 
the Tanzania government passed laws decentralizing the management of marine resources, 
providing for increased use of co-management programs throughout the country.176 
Further research will be required to determine the long-term efficacy of these programs at 
reducing conflict between users.  
D. CONCLUSION 
While Tanzania’s fisheries are facing obvious stresses and have been visibly 
diminished, specific documented incidents of conflict are extremely rare. Published studies 
do refer to an increase in generalized conflict in areas of increased competition for 
resources, but these references seldom include specific details such as types of conflict, 
specific parties involved, or any means of resolution. In places where multiple groups are 
competing over shared fisheries, some instances of conflict have been recorded, and 
typically include bribery, sabotage, or chasing competitors off of fishing grounds. These 
specifics appear infrequently but do typically include mention of formal complaints being 
filed with local management authorities. The common thread across fisheries conflict is a 
noticeable decrease in available fisheries stocks and an equally noticeable increase in 
resource users.  
In places where conflict has arisen, it seems to appear in response to total denial of 
access to traditional grounds. MALF’s response to this has been to implement co-
management with local leadership, which is one possible explanation for the lack of 
documented instances of conflict and reliance on official channels for conflict resolution. 
Employing local leadership provides a known channel to local fishers who feel they have 
a justified complaint and may effectively prevent them from feeling the need to resort to 
conflict. Proactive education in regulations, sustainability, and management at the village 
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leader and individual fisher levels have also ensured that all parties are aware of proper 
avenues and the justifications behind regulations in place. Since strain on fisheries is only 
likely to increase in response to global demand, effective means of management must be 
implemented to prevent the possibility of conflict between parties from arising. Tanzania’s 
co-management strategy, ensuring access for all parties, appears to be an effective answer 
to reducing incidents of conflict and providing users with a mode for formal complaints.   
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V. SOUTH AFRICA CASE STUDY 
The South African case is shaped by the country’s apartheid-era history. The 
distinctly preferential treatment shown to white South Africans shaped the national 
economy and was reflected in virtually every industry, including the country’s fishing 
sector. Within South Africa’s booming fisheries industry, only whites were permitted to 
own licenses for commercial businesses and trawlers; non-whites were relegated to non-
commercial fishing, which barely allowed them to earn a subsistence living from their 
efforts. With the fall of apartheid, these policies underwent complete overhaul, to include 
regulations requiring non-white business ownership and participation in upper levels of 
existing businesses. However, the ongoing effects of apartheid and the economic 
conditions that it created have had a lasting effect on both the fishing sector and the 
fisheries themselves.  
One of the main long-term effects of apartheid policies is that non-whites continue 
to face challenges breaking into the industry. As a result, they often resort to poaching, 
particularly of high value stocks, hampering state-centered management efforts that 
frequently overlook artisanal and small-scale commercial fishers in favor of larger 
commercial entities. These illicit activities are detrimental to fragile fisheries and pose a 
growing threat to legitimate economic activities and community livelihoods. Poor 
management of limited resources after apartheid compounded existing inequalities and 
negated state efforts to effectively manage fishery resources. The failure of the South 
African state to correct the marginalization established during apartheid, combined with 
ineffective management of fisheries resources resulted in rampant poaching that collapsed 
the commercial abalone fishery. 
A. THE LEGACY OF APARTHEID 
Outside of the fishing industry, apartheid laws placed significant restrictions on 
employment opportunities, relegating non-whites, or Historically Disadvantaged 
Individuals (HDIs) to living in low-income, politically and economically marginalized 
communities with few government services, and poor educational opportunities. If active 
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government investment is key to economic growth, non-white communities stood virtually 
no chance of improving their situation.177 The lack of government presence in these 
communities fostered an environment of poor government legitimacy that carried on in 
many communities to the post-apartheid era.178 In these marginalized communities, the 
absence of viable employment and educational opportunities during apartheid kept 
incomes consistently low and widespread poverty continued even after apartheid fell. In 
this economic and political environment, while the repeal of apartheid laws has opened 
numerous new doors to opportunity, many individuals and communities lacked the 
resources, education, experience, or infrastructure necessary to break into the already 
competitive and white-dominated world of commercial fishing. Since apartheid ended, the 
state has been unable to rapidly address the lasting effects, due in part to overwhelming 
demand, understaffing, and poor funding, and many communities continued to be ignored. 
The fishing sector is one example of apartheid laws continuing to negatively affect 
communities in the post-apartheid era. 
Apartheid laws were apparent in the fishing industry in the allocation of large scale, 
commercial licenses exclusively to white owned corporations, whereas non-white fishers 
were permitted only limited use licensing or deemed outright illegal.179 A well-established 
and efficient commercial fishing industry can improve both the local and national level 
economies, making it appealing to national governments that actively promote the activity. 
The financial advantages of a well-established fishing industry were not lost on the 
apartheid national government, which actively promoted commercial scale activities over 
those of small-scale subsistence or artisanal fishers that add little to the national economy. 
Policies deliberately favored commercial fishing over subsistence or artisanal fishing in an 
effort to promote economic growth. While these large commercial fishing businesses 
served as significant sources of employment for non-whites who worked on land at fish 
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packing and processing plants, or out on the fishing fleets, they were seldom seen in high 
level or management positions. Unable to acquire commercial fishing licenses, non-whites 
were relegated almost exclusively to small-scale and artisanal fishing in their local 
communities, selling in local markets or fishing exclusively for subsistence, but excluded 
from the national economy. Small-scale fishing was considered insignificant to the national 
economy and virtually ignored in both the issuing of licenses as well as law enforcement, 
opening the door for illegal activities that would later undermine management efforts. 
During apartheid, local fishermen at the subsistence and artisanal level, when 
granted legal status at all, fell under recreational licenses that had very limited allowable 
catches.180 Authorized catch size was insufficient for small-scale or artisanal fishers to 
attempt any commercial pursuits on any scale, let alone on a level sufficient to compete 
with the large, white-owned trawlers. Due to the extremely low catch volume authorized 
by recreational licenses, local fishers were restricted to small scale, community based 
markets, resulting in a number of domestic, community-based fishing markets that operated 
on a much smaller scale than the commercial fishers that primarily exported their catch.181 
Quotas for the commercial sector were significantly higher than for non-white fishers, with 
as much as 95 per cent of the total allowable catch (TAC) reserved for white-owned 
companies, leaving the remaining five per cent of licenses available for non-whites. These 
remaining licenses were ultimately sold to white-owned companies.182  
The preference for large-scale economic performance over community-based 
fishing, excluding artisanal fishers from their livelihoods, created an ongoing problem in 
the immediate post-apartheid years. Newly established official recognition of the artisanal 
fishing sector and the promise of access to previously denied resources increased demand 
for artisanal licenses and rapidly overwhelmed state capacity. In the years following 
apartheid, the South African government began implementing new policies intended to 
integrate formerly excluded populations into ownership and management positions within 
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the commercial fishing industry. New policies aimed for 80 per cent of commercial fishing 
to be non-white owned or managed to match the national ethnic ratio of non-whites to 
whites, and granted legal recognition to small-scale and artisanal fishers.183 Businesses 
began integrating non-whites into higher levels of management and shareholding, though 
most upper levels of management and ownership were still reserved for whites.184  
As a result of the new laws enacted in 1998, non-white participation in large-scale 
commercial fishing boomed from .75 percent to 62 percent in just ten years.185 The total 
number of commercial fishing businesses also expanded dramatically from just 300 to 5837 
(including individual license owners) in the same timeframe.186 These numbers illustrate 
the increase in commercial fishing licenses allocated for non-white business entrepreneurs 
after decades of exclusion, but they also indicate the sudden expansion of access rights to 
thousands of new users seeking to utilize the same fisheries. These initiatives opened the 
fishing industry to entire populations that were previously denied access, but also paved 
the way for significant future decreases in the total allowable catch for each user if 
sustainable fisheries populations were to be maintained.  
As illustrated, post-apartheid policy changes allowed some non-white fishers to 
step into the commercial industry. However, few were able to gather the capital required 
to start their own commercially competitive businesses. Early participation under the new 
policies for non-whites that caused the dramatic increase of non-white participation 
consisted primarily of positions granted within white-owned corporations and did not 
reflect a sudden increase in non-white owned businesses. Decades of economic repression 
prevented non-whites from gaining sufficient capital to purchase the necessary equipment 
to modernize their existing vessels or to start new fishing businesses, let alone to compete 
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with existing commercial fishers.187 Despite new laws and policies, many HDIs were 
considered too inexperienced to be trusted with the complex management of large, 
internationally integrated fishing industries, limiting their opportunities within established 
companies.188 The legacy of years of repression under government policies was continued 
economic and political marginalization under new laws.  
B. CONFLICT IN THE ABALONE SECTOR 
Following apartheid, licenses in the abalone sector were upgraded to limited 
commercial status and catch limits were increased.189 In addition to new legal status, 
abalone resources, which were previously restricted for commercial industry, were opened 
to small-scale fishers’ personal and limited commercial use. The new laws brought 
previously marginalized fishers and fishing communities under legal regulation, granting 
artisanal fishers legal status that they had been denied under apartheid laws, and expanded 
the total number of licenses available in all sectors, including abalone. South Africa’s entire 
post-apartheid fishing industry extended access and recognition of previously excluded and 
marginalized populations of artisanal fishers to fisheries resources, significantly increasing 
the number of users and demand on local fisheries as legal status attracted new fishers to 
the whole industry. 
Expanded legal access and more licenses led to a massive increase in license 
applications as formerly illegal and newly interested artisanal fishers sought access to the 
industry. Overwhelmed by new regulations and applications and suffering from severe 
staffing and budget cuts, government offices fell far behind demand in issuing licenses, 
leaving artisanal fishermen who expected legal and increased access to resources in 
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limbo.190 The expanded legal access placed growing pressure on already strained stocks, 
leading the government to reduce TACs, especially in the abalone fishery, shortly after 
expanding access.191 On top of the added bureaucracy, and reduction in allowable catch, 
the cost of licenses increased significantly. This combination of lengthy delays, significant 
price increases, and suddenly reduced resource access pushed artisanal fishers to the fringes 
of legality as they pursued what they felt was their legal share of resources. Under these 
conditions, illegal fishing began to take hold, particularly of highly valuable abalone. 
Specifically within abalone fisheries, many small-scale and artisanal fishers took to 
openly fishing illegally as a form of protest against the state’s ineffective resource 
management and failure to grant legal access.192 Marginalized communities that had been 
ignored throughout the apartheid years offered few alternatives to abalone poaching and 
fishing communities largely accepted the practice owing to their dependence on the food 
and income that it generated.193 Communities and officials that chose to ignore increasing 
incidents of illegal fishing granted unofficial permission for poachers to continue 
unfettered. Staffing cuts to law enforcement caused by reduced budgets under the new 
government, especially in communities at the edges of enforceable domain in which illegal 
fishing gained traction, left poachers at little risk of persecution. Without effective 
regulation, abalone poachers had virtually unfettered access to otherwise increasingly 
regulated and scarce resources.194 In light of this massive increase in illegal fishing, the 
government attempted to increase regulation on small scale fishers by granting limited 
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commercial licenses specifically for abalone, which increased individual TACs and 
enabled the government to more closely monitor otherwise overlooked fishers. However, 
the growing number of abalone fishers meant that TACs for the licenses were subsequently 
and continually reduced, even as demand and value continued rising.195 The high value 
and international demand for abalone made this sector particularly vulnerable to poaching 
and demands for expanded access, making it an extreme example of how supply and 
demand can spiral into conflict.  
Demand in Asia for large quantities of abalone incentivized poaching by creating a 
thriving black market for the luxury item that spawned highly organized and lucrative 
Asian crime syndicates operating in South Africa. When the government imposed stringent 
controls intended to maintain sustainable fisheries populations, the price of poached 
abalone soared, enabling poachers to provide a viable living for themselves and their 
families and encouraging even more poaching and further depleting the fragile stocks.196 
Eventually, this livelihood became widely accepted as a means of employment and 
poachers’ numbers increased, decimating struggling abalone populations. It was under 
these conditions of illegal and unrestricted poaching in marginalized communities that 
conflict between poachers and law enforcement erupted in the early 2000’s, fueling what 
has become known as the “abalone wars.”197 
Conflict between abalone poachers and enforcement officers escalated to a level 
that exceeded the capacity of maritime law enforcement. Fisheries enforcement officers 
have been threatened, attacked and chased from poaching grounds in their efforts to enforce 
abalone restrictions.198  Hostilities have increased to the point that enforcement dogs are 
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being threatened, with bounties offered by crime syndicates on abalone sniffing police 
dogs.199 Neighborhoods where poaching is a primary form of employment are often too 
dangerous for law enforcement officers to venture in their attempts to curb the illegal 
activity, run primarily by Asian crime syndicates.200 In areas where state capacity is 
absent, the numerous crime syndicates have stepped in to provide services that the 
government is unable or unwilling to.201  Syndicates provide employment and security 
against rival syndicates as well as against federal enforcement agents seeking to curb the 
illegal abalone trade. This arrangement has directly affected the national economy as 
abalone stocks have dwindled to the point of commercial extinction. Attempts to rescue 
the abalone fishery for commercial use forced the government to place severe restrictions 
on commercial fishers, halting all commercial fishing in late 2007 and authorizing only 
150 tons of abalone per year in 2017, down from over 600 tons in the 1990’s.202 Despite 
government attempts to limit abalone fishing, the total illegal catch is estimated to be as 
much as ten times higher than the legal commercial exports, roughly 2000 tons between 
2001-2008.203  
C. MANAGEMENT 
Abalone poaching began in response to the state’s failure to address local demands 
for effective management and legal access to diminished stocks, neglecting local needs and 
cutting communities out of the management process. National management programs 
failed to grant local fisherman legal status or work with the community to manage abalone 
populations, encouraging the now rampant illegal trade that has led to lawlessness and 
decimation of the fragile resource. Abalone has become so scarce that poachers have 
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expanded their efforts beyond marginalized communities where they originated and spread 
unhindered along the coast of South Africa.204 Poaching has reduced abalone stocks so 
significantly that the government sought to manage the problem by severely reducing legal 
commercial limits before being discontinued completely in many former fishing grounds 
in 2008, affecting the larger economy and jobs within the commercial fishing industry 
itself.205 The continuation of this ecological dilemma over several decades is an indication 
of institutional failure, lack of government legitimacy, and failure to consider local 
community needs, demonstrating the most extreme examples of failed national 
management programs.  
Perceptions of small scale and artisanal fishers during apartheid were negative and 
prejudiced, contributing to governmental unwillingness to incorporate fishing communities 
into management strategies. Non-commercial fishers were “a socio-economic problem 
both caused by and causing the inshore fishers’ perceived backwardness, illiteracy, 
improvidence and lack of sobriety.”206 Government investment in the community reflected 
this attitude and was minimal, at best. Small scale and artisanal fishers and their 
communities’ interests were sidelined in favor of whites and commercial fishing. 
Everything from direct resource access to fisheries health and data research, overseen by 
the national government, favored trawlers and commercial fishing over small scale and 
artisanal fishers.207 The abalone fishing industry is one example of how thorough the 
political and economic marginalization of these communities was and how it carried 
through into post-apartheid. 
Many communities in which poachers thrive still lie beyond the boundaries where 
effective fisheries management and enforcement operates, a common challenge that 
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national management programs face in states with limited resources. South Africa’s 
expansive coastline makes more remote communities difficult for state agents to access, 
compounding issues with resource management and the ability to curb illicit activities.208 
Efforts on the part of law enforcement officials to crack down on poaching and enforce 
existing laws in areas with significant poaching problems have been met with violence 
resulting in the deaths of law enforcement officers. Fisheries enforcement officers have 
been openly threatened, attacked and chased from poaching grounds.209 The lack of state 
capacity in these areas has been replaced by organized crime that buys poached abalone to 
ship overseas to Asia, bypassing national management regulations and enforcement 
officers. The absent state has been unable to address the deeply embedded syndicates that 
encourage continued poaching of now commercially extinct abalone. State efforts to 
enforce management in communities where neglect during apartheid continued well into 
the post-apartheid years enabled poaching to begin and gain widespread local acceptance. 
Continued marginalization and failure to address the communities’ needs, cutting off 
access to a critical resource, enabled the illegal fishing industry and organized crime to 
take firm hold.  
The state’s failure to adequately respond to local demands for inclusive 
management and legal access to diminished stocks facilitated the rise of abalone poaching. 
Based on evidence from previous examples, government efforts to incorporate the 
community into abalone management would have likely mitigated the now rampant illegal 
trade that has led to lawlessness and decimation of the fragile resource. Entire communities 
and the South African abalone species are suffering as a result of poor management. In the 
face of weak national management, abalone has become so scarce that poachers have 
expanded their efforts beyond marginalized communities and spread along the coast of 
South Africa, unhindered by government enforcement officers that lack sufficient 
resources or communities that have no authority to deter poachers’ progress into new 
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territory. Severely diminished abalone stocks forced reductions in legal commercial limits, 
affecting the national economy and jobs within the legal fishing industry itself.210 The 
continuation of this ecological dilemma over the last several decades exemplifies how 
national management programs that fail to incorporate local communities can promote 
disregard for regulations and lead to widespread conflict.  
Fisheries resource management programs are critical to maintaining and enforcing 
effective, sustainable policies. In regions where resource management and policy 
enforcement consider the needs of local populations, resource users are more compliant 
with laws and regulations, and the managed resources produce larger, more abundant 
fish.211 The positive effects of resource management are especially evident in the fishing 
industry where local fishers and communities have vested interests in the health of the 
fisheries that provide their food and livelihoods. The case of South Africa’s abalone is 
unique in that the resource in question was used primarily as an economic resource due to 
its incredibly high value, and less as a critical food resource, limiting the communities’ 
vested interest in the health of the fishery.  
In addition to management, community participation in research “has been 
particularly persuasive in convincing them of the need for controls on catches,” a 
perspective that is seemingly absent in South Africa’s abalone industry.212 Management 
policies are better received when local fishers and communities understand the justification 
behind them, necessitating effective education programs and cooperation between 
communities and state agencies. When local communities are able to participate in resource 
management and regulations enforcement, a lower incidence of policy violations are 
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documented.213 Fishers are less likely to violate regulations when they understand that 
such policies are in place to improve the quality of the fishery, ultimately increasing the 
quality and quantity of each fishers’ individual catch.  
D. CONCLUSION 
South Africa’s fisheries have undergone significant changes under the post-
apartheid government, but the effects of apartheid era marginalization have carried through 
to today. Ineffective fisheries management alienated local communities, denying them 
access to critical resources and creating a situation where local communities are pitted 
against management enforcement officials. South Africa’s existing fisheries management 
programs have proven unsustainable for abalone fisheries, local communities, the 
commercial fishing industry, and law enforcement alike. After years of failure, South 
Africa’s national management strategy has demonstrated that it is ineffective at bridging 
the gap between alienated fishing communities and national fisheries management 
programs.  
 South Africa’s centralized management denied locals both access to abalone and 
any role in their management, promoting a high level of policy violations by disaffected 
fishers and their communities, forcing local fishers to turn to poaching to provide for 
themselves and their families.214 Apartheid era abalone management deliberately 
benefitted large, commercial, white-owned fishers while local non-white fishermen and 
communities were ignored. Following apartheid, when local fishermen were finally 
granted access to dwindling abalone resources, the process of legalization and 
authorization was so lengthy and expensive that fishermen chose to bypass poorly enforced 
nationally implemented laws, resorting to illegal fishing. Post-apartheid centralized 
management imposed restrictions on abalone fishers that excluded local subsistence or 
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economic needs of commercial fishers in their top-down management efforts.215 
Communities reliant on abalone for sustenance, and income as it became increasingly 
valuable, had little motivation to prevent local fishermen from poaching a resource that 
they were officially restricted from exploiting. Poaching for economic benefits provided a 
means of income that disaffected communities desperately needed. Restrictive laws and 
resource mismanagement created an environment in which fishermen and their 
communities felt their access to critical stocks was being denied, a situation that encourages 
individuals to fight against regulations that cut them off from their means of economic 
survival. The response to denial of access was flagrant poaching that escalated into a 
national level security and economic crisis.   
South Africa’s abalone is distinct in that it serves as a primarily economic rather 
than subsistence resource. However, in communities lacking economic alternatives, the 
income that abalone generates is critical for individuals and the community as a whole. 
Centralized management programs that denied access to abalone stocks effectively denied 
local communities their primary, potentially sole, means of income. Inclusive management 
strategies that grant local communities access to abalone stocks and a role in their 
management and recovery could mitigate their sense of exclusion. Local management 
could allow communities to create formal local economic trade that would encourage both 
communities and individuals to help sustain abalone stocks, in the interest of ensuring 
future economic survival. Poaching has become a form of protest against centralized 
management that excludes both communities and individuals, whereas decentralized 
management could mitigate that sense of alienation and place enforcement responsibility 
with communities themselves. While the government is largely aware of the significance 
of community buy-in, centralized management remains the primary means of 
enforcement.216 Adopting co-management would require the South African government 
to work with local communities it has traditionally shunned and to consider how local 
                                                 
215 Paul Steyn, “Poaching for Abalone, Africa’s ‘White Gold,’ Reaches Fever Pitch: A Booming 
Illegal Trade in Abalone – the World’s most Valuable Shellfish – is Fueling a Social and Environmental 
Crisis in South Africa,” National Geographic, 14 February, 2017, https://news.nationalgeographic.com/
2017/02/wildlife-watch-abalone-poaching-south-africa/. 
216 Derica Lambrechts and Khalil Goga. “Money and Marginalisation: The Lost War Against Abalone 
Poaching in South Africa, Politikon.” South African Journal of Political Studies, 238. 
 74 
economies affect the national commercial industry. Until the South African government is 
willing to delegate management authority to the local level, communities and individuals 
will likely continue to employ poaching as a form of protest to the detriment of abalone 
stocks and long-term economic survival. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Fisheries across Africa face increasing strain resulting from growing numbers of 
resources users, climate change, pollution, and mismanagement. Africa’s fisheries are 
particularly vulnerable to the effects of increased use and climate change. Traditionally 
used as a local source of income and food, African fisheries have garnered international 
attention as foreign fisheries decline in the face of growing global demand. International 
commercial fishers now ply African waters in competition with local artisanal fishermen, 
often depleting local stocks and fishing illegally. Paralleling the growth of commercial 
fleets, growing numbers of artisanal fishers are also turning to fishing for their livelihoods. 
The increased demand from these two sectors, commercial and artisanal, threatens to 
overwhelm the capacity of fish populations to replenish, endangering both industries. 
Increasing competition has brought with it violent clashes between groups as they seek to 
protect their livelihoods from diminishing stocks and growing numbers of users.  
Adding to the crowded commercial fishing grounds, increasing demand from 
recreational fishers compounds existing stress on fisheries and their habitats. Increased 
tourism and coastal development is adding to threats posed to critical fishery habitats, 
reducing available spawning and feeding grounds. Fish species are now being targeted 
heavily for food while simultaneously losing habitat required to replenish fish populations. 
Pollution contributes to habitat destruction that further degrades fisheries’ abilities to 
sustain themselves, reducing the available fish that commercial, artisanal and recreational 
fishers compete for. This growing environment of competition has led, in many 
circumstances, to an increase in conflict within fisheries.  
Increases in consumption have coincided with decreases in available fish resources, 
forcing fisheries users into closer and closer contact with one another, often resulting in 
conflict. The vast majority of resulting conflict remains at low level, consisting of 
vandalism, boat ramming, or attempts to restrict access to fishing grounds. However, in 
some places, like South Africa and Somalia, where management is either non-existent or 
users have been completely cut off from fisheries access, conflict has been more extreme, 
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leading to national and international level attention and intervention. In addition, as scarcity 
increases in the future, incidents of conflict may escalate in frequency and severity. 
As pressure on fisheries continues to rise, local populations dependent on near-
shore fisheries for food and income must learn to cope with the changing dynamics. 
Moving forward, the degree of conflict will be influenced by the style and efficacy of 
fisheries management employed in the region. Management will play an increasingly 
important role in preserving artisanal and commercial industries while simultaneously 
preventing widespread conflict.  
Both national management and co-management seek to maintain healthy fishery 
populations and control commercial, artisanal and recreational fishery use, but each 
approaches these goals differently. National management relies on national laws and 
enforcement. Local communities and commercial fishing entities are required to adhere to 
state-based control efforts. Co-management engages with local populations for assistance 
in enforcement and to help determine regulations to best promote fishery sustainability. 
Although each form of management works toward the same goals, their ability to mitigate 
conflict is not equal and depends on the makeup of the fisheries users in a given area. 
As illustrated in the Tanzania case study, employing co-management has been more 
effective in ensuring adherence to fisheries regulations among artisanal fishers and local 
communities. Those communities that have been included in the regulations process are 
more likely understand the justification behind such regulations and less likely to feel that 
their access to their critical resource is being denied. In situations where communities have 
been allowed to participate in regulations enforcement, fewer instances of conflict and 
regulations violations are observed.  
The support and involvement of the local community are critical to the success of 
fisheries management programs. National management programs that mandate regulations 
and enforcement on communities run the risk of alienating the fishing community and 
increasing the prevalence of regulations violations. In the case of South Africa, this 
dynamic led to conflict between the artisanal fishers and the state government, resulting in 
a nationwide crisis that collapsed the commercial abalone fishery. These two cases 
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demonstrate the significance of an effective management program that incorporates local 
interests to protect critical fishery resources and mitigate the chances of conflict over 
dwindling resources.  
Despite the advantages of co-management programs, there are risks associated. 
Allowing communities complete autonomy with local resources may increase the risk of 
conflict in areas where multiple types of resource users operate. Migrant and commercial 
fishers may be deliberately denied access to fisheries if the community feels there are 
insufficient resources for all users or based off of historical hostility between groups. This 
could lead to a similar dynamic in which communities conflict with state mandated 
programs that sever their access to fisheries, resulting in an increase in incidents of conflict 
from the disaffected group. For this reason, even co-management programs require 
oversight to ensure that fisheries are being responsibly managed so as to reduce conflict.  
Effective management programs must also incorporate executable means for 
settling disagreements between users. In cases where artisanal fishers felt that they had 
recourse outside of conflict, such as effective regulations enforcers, incidents of conflict 
were relatively low. State-based programs lacking in sufficient resources to effectively 
staff programs are often unable to provide viable conflict settlement, leading to an increase 
in incidents of conflict. This dynamic suggests that in areas where co-management is not a 
viable option, national management strategies must provide a viable means of dispute 
resolution for users. For many African countries, this may limit national management 
programs to areas in close proximity to enforcement authorities and regions where there is 
a mix of commercial, migrant, and artisanal users in a small area. Regardless of the type of 
management program employed, effective conflict settlement is critical to mitigating 
hostilities between groups in resource strained environments.  
Both management strategies demonstrate very different results when examined in 
each case study. National management is employed by the national government and has 
the effect of alienating local communities from the management process, creating 
resentment and fostering discord in many areas, often failing to effective implement 
management tasks or achieve goals. On the other side of the equation, co-management 
incorporates local communities into the management process, improving community level 
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compliance and improving conservation efforts. Based on the information available, co-
management offers a more effective management strategy in areas where local 
communities are active in fisheries and reliant on maritime resources. This management 
style requires close collaboration between the community and the national government to 
effectively educate, train and equip communities. However, in areas where local 
communities have low dependence on fisheries resources, co-management will be less 
effective. Similarly, issues may arise in areas with large numbers of migrant fishers or 
commercial fishing, should communities attempt to exclude other users from fishery 
resources. In these areas, co-management must be combined with some level of oversight 
to prevent potential conflict. National management may prove a viable option if 
government resources are sufficient to provide effective enforcement in areas where 
commercial, migrant, and local fishers are equal users.  
Africa is one illustration of a growing global fisheries depletion problem. 
International fishing vessels ply African waters with increasing frequency as domestic 
fisheries are reduced to the point that they are unable to meet domestic demand. Numbers 
of commercial and local fishers are increasing around the world, necessitating increased 
management on both the domestic and international arenas. Foreign fishing vessels require 
licenses to fish in international waters, but governance of those waters remains the 
obligation of the host nation. Management is key to enforcing regulations and to ensuring 
the health of fisheries in the future, but communities that participate in co-management 
strategies are unable to extend their reach beyond near-shore waters, negating their ability 
to enforce regulations with deep sea fishing vessels. Combining co-management and 
national management is the most likely strategy to maintain compliance in domestic waters. 
Outside Africa, similar issues with fisheries depletion and illegal fishing are also forcing 
countries to re-examine their fishing strategies. Countries particularly at risk of fisheries 
depletion conflict are those dependent on their fisheries, and that have relatively low 
adaptive capacity.217 Many of these countries fall within the tropics and have high rates of 
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poverty.  These countries often lack the resources to field effective enforcement throughout 
their coastline and frequently have remote populations that are reliant on fisheries. These 
countries are both the most in need of effective management programs and the least able 
to implement them, putting them at high risk for conflict resulting from fisheries depletion. 
The findings of this thesis suggest that these countries will be best suited to implementing 
a combination of national management in readily accessible areas of high commercial 
activity and co-management in remote areas primarily utilized by artisanal fishers. 
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